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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
The April 2009 murder/suicide on the campus of Henry Ford Community College in 
Dearborn, Michigan, already a sensational enough story on its own, was pushed further into the 
spotlight when it was revealed that the accused killer, Anthony Powell, and his victim, Asia 
McGowen, had both posted material to the popular Internet video-sharing site YouTube.  Still 
frames of Powell's videos, carefully selected to show his face twisted in laughter, anger, or 
frustration, filled the airwaves (clickondetroit.com 2008).  Similarly, within hours of the 
announcement that vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s daughter was pregnant, bloggers and 
the news media dug up the father-to-be's Myspace page.  The pronouncements that he was a 
“fuckin’ redneck” who liked to “shoot shit” drew worldwide attention, no small feat for an 
otherwise unremarkable 18 year old from a small town (Goldsmith & Lisi 2008; Stirland 2008).  
The process has almost become commonplace now; a young person is involved in a newsworthy 
event and the media immediately combs their MySpace, Facebook, or Livejournal for clues.  
Ethical issues aside, what is it about MySpace and other social network sites that encourages 
young people to reveal personal and even potentially compromising information about 
themselves to an anonymous audience?1   
More than half of all U.S. adolescents report using social network sites like Myspace and 
Facebook (Lenhart & Madden 2007:ii).  For today's teens, SNS serve a role much like the 
shopping mall or movie theater did for past generations, being a space where teenagers can do as 
they please with (a perception of) limited adult oversight, with two major differences – SNS can 
                                                 
1The term “social network site” is used in lieu of the conventional “social networking site” as the majority of SNS 
users are replicating existing social networks, rather than using the sites to build entirely new networks (boyd 
2007). 
2 
be accessed virtually anywhere; from home, school, or even via a web-capable cell phone, and 
SNS can be accessed by virtually anyone (boyd 2007; Kane 2008).  Indeed, their popularity is so 
pervasive, and their perceived risk (whether to users' safety or to employers' productivity) is so 
great that the U.S. Congress has proposed multiple pieces of legislation that would block social 
network site access in schools and libraries, the U.S. military and Canadian government have 
prohibited employees from using social network sites, and the city of Bozeman, Montana 
requires all job applicants to provide usernames and account passwords for their social network 
profiles (Ricker 2009; boyd 2007).  Thirty-two percent of teens report being contacted by a 
stranger online, with several factors strongly correlating to stranger contact, most notably 
possession of a social network profile (Lenhart 2007:ii; Wolak 2006).  While many teens who 
have social network profiles attempt to mask their identities, 63% believe that a sufficiently 
thorough search could reveal their identity (Lenhart 2007:v).  Despite this, some teens openly 
share potentially dangerous information, such as full names, phone numbers, and even street 
addresses.  In the wrong hands, this information can be used to stalk or harass users, or even to 
generate false documents for identity theft.  Peers, family members, and present and future 
employers can see this information as well, creating problems when information meant for one 
social network comes into the possession of an unintended audience.   
Clearly, users are not blindly throwing their personal data to the wind – there is an 
obvious expectation of privacy among on-line users, although there seems to be a strong 
disconnect between users' expectations and reality (boyd 2007).  A recent imbroglio on Facebook 
involved a third-party advertiser's unauthorized use of members' profile photos on the site, 
resulting in one user being invited to meet “hot singles” such as his own wife (Ostrow 2009).  
3 
The concern here was obvious – Facebook receives money from advertisers, who then use 
Facebook members' likenesses without express permission.  The issue received national 
attention, eventually resulting in an official statement from Facebook, explaining that the ads 
were in violation of company policies (Schnitt 2009).  The statement did not, however, offer any 
guidance as to using Facebook's “opt-out” policy for approved advertisements. 
There are a myriad of benefits to Internet use for teenagers, but there are also a host of 
potential problems; parents identify concerns such as emotional harm or addiction or the Internet 
as a gateway for sexual predators and deviants of all stripes to enter the home (Internet Safety 
Technical Task Force 2009).  Much of the existing research on teenage Internet use, whether it 
involves social network sites or not, focuses on these risk issues; attempting to offer policy 
implications or parental advice (e.g. how to keep children safe on-line).  However, a more subtle 
problem comes in the form of identity risk; teenagers clearly use the Internet to explore the world 
around them and to present themselves to their peers for approval.  Hazards can arise when these 
presentations are inappropriate in a larger social context, or when otherwise normative 
presentations are misappropriated for harmful purposes.  My research, while interested in the 
safety and policy aspects of adolescent Internet use, will focus primarily on the motivations for 
such risky behaviors.  Specifically, what are teens doing on-line in the first place and what role 
do social networks play in the process?  This research will generally target the relatively new 
medium of social network sites (SNS), although references to other forms of computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) will be made when relevant.  SNS operate as a unique vector for identity 
performance – users “offer themselves up for surveillance,” creating a profile that may reinforce 
existing cultural norms, but also allows for fluidity and resistance, as the profile (and the 
4 
resulting identity being presented) can be altered at will (Westlake 2008:23).  Using a data set 
from The Pew Internet and American Life Project (PIAL), this research will analyze the 
relationship between teenagers' offline and online social networks as well as the influence of 
these networks on teens' identity creation practices and their willingness to share personal 
information online.  The data will also allow an exploration of teenagers' perception of the 
Internet as a risky environment, as well as parental efforts to mediate teens' Internet use.  The end 
goal of this research is to provide potential explanations for a relatively new social phenomenon 
that is of interest to educators, parents, legislators, and private industry, hopefully while 
remaining true to teenagers' own motives, goals, and understandings of a complex situation. 
A Typology of Aspects of Computer-Mediated Communication: Directionality, Response, 
Persistence 
Digital identities are fascinating because they often are expressed in multiple dimensions 
– users interact through CMC in a variety of forms, each with its own unique attributes.2   Early 
research into CMC proposed that multiple anonymous spaces (such as Multi-User Dungeons or 
MUDs, chat rooms, and bulletin boards) might allow a potential fracturing of the individual into 
a sort of postmodern collage of distinct personalities, with opportunities for a great deal of 
fluidity and play with sexuality, gender, and other identities (Rheingold 1995; Surratt 1998; 
Turkle 1995).  However, research into contemporary, less-anonymous CMC venues such as 
personal websites, Internet dating, and SNS suggest the various profiles an individual generates 
are not distinct experimentations with completely new identities, but specifically-targeted 
                                                 
2 Schau & Gilly (2003) use the term “digital self”, while Booth (2008) uses “persona” to refer to users' online 
identities.  I will use “profile” as it the term most commonly associated with social network sites. 
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representations of a singular self-identity (Schau & Gilly 2003; Yurchisin et al. 2005; Zhao et al. 
2008). 
Virtually all forms of CMC can be organized by three key aspects: directionality of 
communication (multi- versus unidirectional), response rate expectation (real-time versus 
displaced response), and persistence of data (persistent versus fixed).  Multi-directional 
communication refers to those forms of contact where two or more individuals actively engage in 
a dialogue with each other: e-mail, chat rooms, instant messaging, message boards, and multi-
player gaming all fall into this category.  Unidirectional communication is one-sided; the user 
only interacts with the material.  There is communication, but it is mediated by the format; 
creators post content for an audience, and the audience engages with that content, but there is no 
allocation for cross-communication without switching methods.  The browsing and creation of 
traditional web sites, blog posts and single-player online gaming generally fall into this category.   
Real-time response is exactly what it sounds like; the users interact with an expectation of 
prompt response.  Chat rooms, instant messaging, and gaming generally fit this description.  
Conversely, displaced response is detached, as users have an expectation of time to think and 
generate their ideas before replying, if they choose to reply at all; e-mail, blog comments, and 
message boards tend to fit this category. 
Finally, persistent methods are generally stored remotely and can be accessed again at a 
later date or from a different location – traditional websites, archived email and most message 
boards fit this description.  The semi-permanent nature of these sites allows their creators to 
“present a physically absent self to others” long after the communication has been completed 
(Schau & Gilly 2003:394).  Fluid methods are relatively transient and leave little lasting trace; 
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chat rooms and instant messages are gone the moment a user closes the program, unless a copy 
was intentionally saved.  Most online games fit this category as well.3    
In all of these categories, SNS are unusual – SNS profiles combine the unidirectional 
communicative aspect of a traditional website through the posting of blogs, quizzes, photos, and 
other created content with the multi-directionality afforded by chat areas, “wall posts” and the 
like; they include real-time and displaced aspects via “status updates,” integrated instant 
messaging capabilities, and user mail; and are both fluid and permanent – status updates and wall 
posts disappear from the “front page” after a while, as do the various toys and quizzes, but all of 
these things are archived elsewhere on the profile unless actively deleted.  In keeping with boyd 
& Ellison (2007), social network sites are defined as any web-based community that allows users 
to (1) generate a virtual representation of themselves (a “profile”), (2) visibly link their profiles 
with those of other users (via “Friending” or similar agreed-upon relationships), (3) view and 
explore this list of connections as well as those of others in the community (via a “Friends of 
Friends” list, a search engine or browsing functionality, or some other system).4  I would add a 
fourth qualifier to boyd and Ellison's definition: the ability of connected users to modify or 
append one another's profiles in some way (most commonly via the posting of “comments”).  
While SNS can be used to create new relationships, users largely communicate with people who 
are already a part of their social network (Ellison et al. 2007; Strano 2008).  The unifying theme 
for the site may vary – it may be an online replication of a pre-existing school or business 
                                                 
3An exception would be “persistent world” online games (such as World of Warcraft or Second Life), where the 
game world exists on a remote server and continues to exist even after an individual user leaves the game (James 
et al. 2004).  Even then, an absent player generally 'disappears' from the game world and cannot be affected by 
other users. 
4For clarity, the act of creating such social connections on SNS will be referred to as Friending, and the individuals 
engaged in such connections will be referred to as Friends, after boyd & Ellison (2007).  This will hopefully 
prevent confusion in later chapters when discussing online Friends versus offline friendship networks. 
7 
network (Facebook for students, LinkedIn for professionals) or based in some commonality of 
age, location, or interest (Yelp! for local business reviews, MyChurch for Christians) (boyd & 
Ellison 2007; Hinduja & Patchin 2008).  The data set I use in this study identifies MySpace and 
Facebook as the most popular SNS amongst adolescents, but many other sites fit these criteria - 
even Amazon.com has introduced some social network elements to its service, allowing users to 
Friend one another based on their reviews of products. 
Historically, CMC presentations were limited entirely to the content a creator put forth; 
“the specific content of posting is, in itself, a definition of the poster.” (Booth 2008:527). With 
traditional web sites, message boards, and the like, a creator's identity is defined solely by 
information they have complete control over, but a social network profile is not just the product 
of its creator – it is a shared text, as Friends or other guests can alter the profile in a variety of 
ways; adding messages, linking to photographs, or using features such as “poking” or the giving 
of “virtual gifts”, which adds another layer of complication to the process of self-presentation.  A 
carefully constructed presentation can be dismantled very quickly by an unflattering revelation.  
Notably, the fluid nature of SNS can extend beyond the interest, desire, or capability of the 
profile's creator; most strikingly in cases where profile creators die, as other users may turn such 
profiles into impromptu virtual memorials (Williams & Merten 2009).5 
 It is important to note that Friend networks of the type seen on SNS are not necessarily 
correlated 1:1 with off-line 'real world' social networks.  Boyd (2009) identifies three different 
potential understandings of the concept of a “social network”: (1) the traditional sociological 
sense of the various and sundry interpersonal affiliations an individual holds; (2) behavioral 
                                                 
5Intriguingly, comments left by adolescents on the profiles of deceased peers are virtually always directed at the 
decedent rather than other visitors to the profile, and generally written in the form of a standard comment - a first 
person statement addressed to the profile owner (Williams & Merten 2009). 
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networks, the people an individual actually encounters during their regular activity; and (3) 
articulated social networks, the people an individual personally and intentionally identifies as 
being members of a network, and it is this category that SNS fall into.  Essentially, a SNS 
network is “not the same list of people you would say constitute your nearest and dearest” and 
might include “friends, acquaintances, family members, people from your past, fans, professional 
colleagues, familiar strangers, … people you don't particularly like but don't want to offend... and 
the occasional celebrity you think is interesting” (boyd 2009).6   That is not to say there is no 
correlation between these networks whatsoever – as discussed in-depth below, SNS often serve 
as a means for users to communicate with absent friends and to announce and maintain versions 
of their off-line social networks; furthermore, much of the “drama” to be found amongst 
adolescent SNS users is related to the Friending or unFriending of various individuals, or the all-
important matter of which Friends qualify for the vaunted “Top 8” spots on a MySpace profile 
(boyd 2006b; boyd 2007). 
Risk and Mediation 
Online Risks Facing Teenagers 
The Internet Safety Technical Task Force (2008) identifies three main areas for concern 
regarding child and adolescent safety on the Internet; sexual solicitation, cyberbullying, and 
exposure to problematic materials.  Other research identifies privacy risks and the potential 
physical and emotional side-effects of Internet use (lack of physical activity, Internet addiction, 
                                                 
6I currently have over 300 Friends listed on my Facebook profile, ranging from immediate family to professional 
colleagues to high school classmates to relatives I have not seen in over a decade. 
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social isolation, etc.) as areas of potential concern (Hinduja & Patchin 2008; Livingstone & 
Helsper 2008; Rosen et al. 2008).    
Sexual solicitation or “stranger danger” seems to be the most commonly cited concern 
regarding online safety.  83% of parents and 35% of teens in a 2008 study said they were “very 
concerned” or “somewhat concerned” about sexual predators online (Rosen et al. 2008:462).  
More than half of adults in a 2007 survey said “online predators are a threat to the children in 
their households,” despite the fact that only about 13% of adolescents reported being sexually 
solicited online (ISSTF 2008:C-17).  Even then, many of the “predators” soliciting adolescents 
for sexual contact are 21 or younger, with almost half being minors themselves (ISSTF 2008:C-
20).  Furthermore, 92% of teens who report being solicited via CMC react in appropriate ways; 
blocking or reporting the solicitor or simply ignoring the request (Rosen et al. 2008:464, 469).  
This is not to downplay the existence of adult sexual predators, but they are clearly a fraction of 
the overall problem, and their significance has perhaps been over-hyped by media outlets.  Also, 
stranger contact in and of itself does not appear to be inherently risky – between 45% and 79% of 
U.S. adolescents engage in it, and some 10%-15% of teens report inviting online friends to meet 
up offline (ISSTF 2008:C-39-40).  Online friendships that develop an offline component are 
typically nonsexual, between peers of similar age, and generally occur with parental knowledge 
or permission (Wolak et al. 2002). 
Cyber-bullying or online harassment seems to be a topic of less concern, despite it being 
potentially more common than sexual solicitation – depending on the study, between 4% and 
46% of teens report some form of online harassment or bullying (ISSTF 2008:C-23).  The broad 
range of reported cases is due to problems with definition – different studies offer varying 
10 
explanations of what cyber-bullying or online harassment actually consist of, and what, if 
anything, is the difference between the two.  Indeed, given the disparate sample sizes, target 
populations, and definitions of terms found in the research, it is difficult to conclusively say 
much of anything about online harassment.  What is generally accepted is that cyber-bullying is 
seemingly most common amongst older adolescents, the bully and the victim are generally the 
same age and often know each other, and there may be significant gender differences in the 
tactics used (ISSTF 2008).   
On the other hand, much research has been done on adolescents' encounters with 
objectionable material, both wanted and unwanted.  When teens unintentionally come across 
such content the most common sources are unsolicited emails, web sites that use misspelled or 
incorrect URLs of popular sites as traps, or web searches with unanticipated results.7  A recent 
study found that 34% of 10-17 year olds were exposed to some degree of unwanted pornography, 
while only 13% of respondents reported actively seeking out pornographic websites (Wolak et al. 
2006:54).  Other material, while non-sexual, is potentially problematic; hate speech, violent/gory 
imagery, and content related to self-injury.  A particularly common and troubling topic is the 
“pro-ana” community; a loose network of web sites, message boards, and blogs where users 
“promote, celebrate, encourage and support” other users' eating disorders (Mantella 2007:1).    
These sites provide tips on topics such as dieting, escaping detection, and the best ways to induce 
vomiting (Keller et al. 2005; Mastronardi 2003).8 
                                                 
7The practice of registering misleading domain names to entrap careless users (called “typosquatting”) is illegal in 
the United States, but convictions are relatively rare as the perpetrators largely operate outside of the U.S. 
(McMillan 2007). 
8It seems highly unlikely that an adolescent would happen upon a “pro-ana” site unwittingly; such materials are 
probably actively sought out by their consumers. 
11 
Many of the concerns identified by parents and policy professionals as risky are, 
ironically enough, precisely the kinds of activities teenagers are looking for, from a self-
presentation perspective (Livingstone 2008).  Consider this: stranger contact provides an 
opportunity for teens to experiment and explore new identities with relatively little possibility of 
real-world harm, as well as offering potential new friendships, while materials parents deem 
unsuitable or inappropriate (especially those that are sexual in nature) may be actively sought out 
by curious teenagers.   
Identity Vulnerability 
While it is not a direct hazard to teenagers' physical or emotional safety, the privacy risk 
more properly referred to as “identity vulnerability” is a concern on multiple levels.  Identity 
vulnerability refers to the various personally identifiable information that can be revealed by 
people on the Internet (Huffaker 2006).  The data most commonly identified as vulnerable 
includes personal data such as full name, school or business name and home address or contact 
information like instant messaging account, e-mail address and phone number (Hinduja & 
Patchin 2008; Rosen et al. 2008; Williams & Merten 2008).  Of course, there are many ways a 
teenager's confidential information can be unintentionally compromised; a peer or family 
member could share personal data, antagonists could illicitly access a teen's personal computer 
or another computer containing their records (belonging to a school, an employer, or some other 
authorized possessor), or improperly secured communications could be intercepted (Milne et al. 
12 
2004).9  However, the focus of this study is specifically on self-disclosure, i.e., the personal 
information that teenagers themselves choose to distribute. 
In and of itself, identity vulnerability may not put teenagers directly into harm's way, but 
it creates multiple opportunities for short or long-term problems.10  First and foremost, 
identifying data can be used by unwanted parties to stalk, harass, intimidate, or otherwise violate 
the privacy of individuals (Hinduja & Patchin 2008).  Indeed, issues like cyber-bullying and 
stranger contact essentially require a degree of information vulnerability; otherwise, how would 
these individuals decide upon a target?   Without the real-time physical cues of the offline world, 
predators and bullies must rely on the data that is available to them via online interactions. 
Second, and closely related to the first aspect, is the issue of unintended audiences 
accessing vulnerable information.  Profile creators post personal data, photos, or other potentially 
compromising materials with a specific audience in mind – their peer group.  However, problems 
can arise when this material is accessed by individuals other than those for whom it was 
intended.  There are two specific external audiences that want access to teenagers' data, for two 
very different reasons: authority figures such as parents, teachers, and law enforcement seek to 
protect teens while spammers, marketers and predators seek to exploit them, whether 
economically or sexually (boyd 2007).  Teenagers' profiles can include relatively harmless but 
age-inappropriate material, such as profanity, discussions of alcohol and tobacco use, sexual 
activity, photographs in swimsuits or various stages of undress, and so forth (Hinduja & Patchin 
2008; Moreno et al. 2009a; Williams & Merten 2008).  This material, while problematic in the 
                                                 
9A surprising source of identity vulnerability is social organizations such as churches, which may create online 
membership rosters complete with names, photos, and addresses (Hoy & Phelps 2003). 
10One argument is that since so many young people post personal information online when compared to the 
relatively low number of youths who are actually being harmed, identity vulnerability alone is not a valid 
predictor of other, more obviously harmful activity (Wolak et al. 2008). 
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eyes of authority figures, is most likely normative amongst teenage peer groups – discussions of 
drugs and sex are presumably quite similar to those that were traditionally held “under the 
bleachers,” at the drive-in, or in some other adult-free locale, while swimsuit photos and the like 
would presumably have been shared privately instead.11  Some teens have posted more directly 
offending content, including discussions of drug abuse and criminal activity or photographs such 
as “an individual urinating” and “a homemade device captioned as 'a working bomb'” (Williams 
& Merten 2008:264).  In some cases, law enforcement agencies have actually used photographs 
posted on SNS to charge users with crimes including weapon possession and vandalism (Clark 
2009; Perez 2007).   
Beyond the inherently hazardous nature of some of these activities, the idea that the 
Internet is one giant repository for potentially embarrassing data, ready for mining at a moment's 
notice, suggests that Internet users should take greater care, as potential employers, classmates, 
colleagues, and romantic interests can use this archive of virtual information to create their own 
impression of an individual beyond that which was intended to be seen.  Warranting theory 
(Walther & Parks 2002) argues that information about an individual is accepted with greater 
validity when it appears the individual had a limited influence in its creation.  In other words, 
external statements about a person (or “testimonials”) are considered more accurate or reliable 
than a person's own statements about themselves (“disclosures”).  Walther et al. (2009; 2008) 
specifically cited publicly visible Facebook messages as an example of such other-generated 
statements.  Comments left on a profile by the owner's Friends have a strong effect on a 
stranger's perception of the profile creator; a person who has attractive Friends is regarded as 
                                                 
11This does not include, nor does it address the legal ramifications of activities such as the creation of sexually 
explicit material by underage individuals for consumption by other underage individuals. 
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more attractive, complimentary statements about a user improved perceptions of that user, and so 
forth.   This creates another potential hazard; an individual's online persona, created as a form of 
intentional identity management, can be thrown askew by a third party's addition of damaging 
content, whether real or falsified.  Given that 83% of teens who use SNS report having added 
comments to a Friend's picture, and 77% posted messages to a Friend's profile, the possibility for 
this sort of identity harm is considerable (Lenhart 2009a).  As different online communication 
methods require/allow different levels of personal disclosure, information from one profile (real 
name, birthday – commonly found on Facebook) could be matched to information on a separate 
profile (sexual interests, drug status – commonly found on various personal ads) via data shared 
across both profiles (photograph, email address, location), allowing for an unwanted level of 
identity disclosure (Acquisti & Gross 2006).  The more personally identifiable information 
available, the greater the potential risk, especially if connections can be drawn between an 
individual and participation in some objectionable behavior or another (Moscardelli & Divine 
2007). 
From this perspective, it could also be argued that the sort of data that can turn up in an 
online search would be considered similarly vulnerable.  This means there are potentially dozens, 
if not hundreds, of sources of information waiting to be tapped by an external observer.  Any or 
all of this information can then be used to create a sort of virtual “rap sheet” of the target, even 
though the information may be inaccurate, out of date, posted against the person's will, or an 
outright falsification.  Much has been made recently of “Googleability,” the extent to which 
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information about a person is revealed by searching for them online.12  As far back as 2006, 26% 
of hiring managers surveyed said they had used the Internet to do background checks on 
potential employees, and 51% of those managers said they did not hire an applicant based on 
search results (CareerBuilder.com 2006).   
Finally, the sort of information that is commonly available on SNS is the same type of 
information used to verify an individual's identity when registering for secure websites.  In 
theory, it would be quite easy for someone to use information from a social network profile to 
perform a “brute force” attack on the profile owner – recall that the personal email account of 
Alaska governor and Vice-Presidential candidate Sarah Palin was allegedly accessed by a college 
student who used publicly available information (Palin's birthday, ZIP code, and her high school) 
to reset Palin's Yahoo! Mail password (United States Department of Justice 2008).  The 
disclosure of this kind of identifying data is quite normative on SNS – birthdays may be set to 
hidden, but are often readily shared, while much the same is true of home towns and current 
locations.  Other potentially viable data is often revealed accidentally; posted as a seemingly-
harmless bit of self disclosure, “all about me”-type quizzes generally include the sort of 
questions that are used to verify a secured online identity - make and model of first car, names of 
pets, schools attended, and so forth.  In the sort of small-scale attacks described above, the 
opportunity for criminal identity theft or serious fraud is relatively unlikely, although 
                                                 
12 A brief Google search for the author reveals academic publications and conference presentations, as well as social 
network profiles and several websites related to various hobbies and interests.  A deeper, targeted search using 
the right criteria could uncover old chat logs, message board posts, and the like, some of which could be 
potentially embarrassing. 
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compromised accounts could be used to harass the owner or their contacts, held for ransom, 
vandalized or simply deleted outright.13    
A more serious version of this is “phishing,” the creation of a false but seemingly 
trustworthy identity in order to lure victims into giving up personal information (Jagatic et al. 
2007; Jakobsson & Myers 2006).  While phishing is traditionally done via mass e-mails to large 
lists of random individuals, SNS are rapidly becoming a new vector of attack; in at least two 
cases, men used SNS information to access women's personal email accounts, which they then 
scoured for nude photographs (McMillan 2011a, McMillan 2011b).  SNS profiles compromised 
in this way are often used to further distribute the trap to a user's Friends, as a message sent from 
a Friend is more likely to be trusted than one from a stranger (Jagatic et al. 2007:97).  Captured 
SNS profiles may be used to send spam, used by the phishers to post bogus reports of an 
emergency befalling the profile owner and requesting donations from Friends, or simply defaced 
for the phisher's amusement (Richmond 2009; DiSpirito 2010).   
The choice of what information adolescents share is intentional, and often rather 
mundane amongst their peers (Livingstone 2008; Westlake 2008).  Online communities, whether 
frequented by teens or adults, have their own norms that must not be violated; “in order to have 
an effective post, a poster must necessarily construct an identity that is different from the others, 
but similar enough to warrant being in on the same page” (Booth 2008:529).  Teenagers create 
profiles that not only represent themselves, but also reflect their adherence to the norms and 
                                                 
13 The 2007 intrusion and defacing of a California teenager's MySpace profile by individuals reportedly associated 
with the online group “Anonymous” led to a feverishly panicked report by a Los Angeles-area Fox affiliate 
which identified the group as “hackers on steroids” and “domestic terrorists” (Shuman 2007). 
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narratives that are considered relevant and appropriate amongst contemporary youth culture, as 
well as meeting the expectations of their peers; a teenager will use the same site all of her or his 
friends use, share content they feel friends would enjoy, and so forth (Livingstone 2008).  Some 
of the information that older generations consider highly personal (political leaning, religious 
affiliation, and so forth) is considered public to contemporary adolescents, suggesting that the 
boundaries between public and private life might be in a state of flux for the entire cohort 
(Lenhart & Madden 2007:20; Westlake 2008).14    Indeed, Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of 
Facebook, recently stated that privacy is no longer even a “social norm” online, claiming that the 
rise of social networking reflects a decrease in the importance of privacy (Johnson 2010). 
As an example, one key piece of data readily revealed online is “A/S/L,” or the user's 
age, sex, and location.  A/S/L is a key component of user-to-user communication modes like chat 
rooms, where there is often no visual cue to a user's identity (Subrahrnanyam et al. 2006).  SNS 
users' profiles typically contain this critical information, to the point where most contemporary 
research does not even bother to ask teenagers if they reveal this information – it is simply taken 
as assumed.  Age, in particular, is a issue for concern.  By default, MySpace limits its userbase to 
those 14 and older, and all users under the age of 16 have their profiles automatically and 
forcibly set to “private” status (i.e., only accessible by those they allow to see it).  However, 
users can provide false data about their age to bypass this protection;15 a profile nominally 
belonging to a 21-year-old female expressed an interest in “hot boys 11-14,” implying the creator 
was either an adolescent girl who lied about her age to access the site or “an inept paedophile” 
                                                 
14An analysis of the social factors influencing this shift is beyond the scope of this research, but would undoubtedly 
prove fascinating. 
15Hinduja & Patchin found some evidence of age falsification amongst about 8% of MySpace users under the age of 
18, suggesting that the actual figure could be considerably higher (2008:134). 
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(Thelwall 2008:1328).16  Similarly, location, while potentially hazardous in the wrong hands, is 
extremely commonplace – for adolescent users, it is a convenient way to locate peers; if you are 
looking for an individual, their hometown, school, etc. are conclusively identifying factors 
(Lenhart & Madden, 2007:22). 
In this case, age, sex, and location, while definitely information that could be harmful if 
exposed in certain contexts, have become a mundane aspect of online communication.  
Photographs of the profile creator are extremely commonplace as well; between 57% and 79% of 
SNS users have a photograph on their profile (Hinduja & Patchin 2008; Lenhart & Madden 
2007:16).  Personal information is often shared as a means of proving one's identity – Friends 
can authenticate a user based on the photographs and other information present on a profile 
(Livingstone 2008).  Furthermore, the Friending process itself seems to serve as a form of 
identity verification with the Friend population representing a network of individuals who will 
vouch for the user's identity (boyd & Ellison 2007; Donath & boyd 2004).  Given that an 
individual's profile is a social performance, the number of Friends a user has attached to their 
profile could further represent the acceptance of that performance amongst the creator's peers 
(Westlake 2008). 
Simply put, teens share their personal information both to be found by their off-line peers 
and to validate their performances to their on-line peers.  Problems arise when seemingly 
innocuous data is accessed by individuals who use it for purposes that were never intended by 
the subject, whether it be a predator looking for a victim, a potential employer doing a 
background check, peers spreading the latest gossip, or simply Mom and Dad checking up on the 
                                                 
16It is also possible that the profile creator could have been an underaged homosexual male disguised as a female to 
dodge attention, but this seems unlikely – Thewall does not even suggest this as an option. 
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kids.  For teens themselves, the issue with identity risks seems to be less that they shouldn't be 
sharing this information, but rather that adults shouldn't be looking at it – MySpace, to 
paraphrase boyd (2007), is seen as their space. 
Despite the risks, little of the existing research suggests outright rejection of the Internet 
as a venue for adolescent identity work; indeed, much has been made of the positive effects 
online participation has for adolescents.  Communication with a potentially infinitely diverse 
population broadens users' perspectives, and allows for interaction outside their ethnic or cultural 
group (Tynes 2007b; Tynes et al. 2008).  The real-time text-based nature of online 
communication requires advanced cognitive skills (Tynes 2007a; Valkenburg & Peter 2008).  
The friendships generated via online networks create an extended social support structure beyond 
family and immediate peer groups (Tynes 2007a).  Lonely teenagers can practice their social 
skills and use online peers as a sounding board for identity concerns (Valkenburg & Peter 2008).  
Blogs, podcasts, and other forms of decentralized content creation allow for organic cultural 
innovation, potentially free from external influence (Livingstone 2008).  Targeted use of the web 
and new media can potentially increase teenagers' interest in political participation (Lupia & 
Philpot 2005; Quintelier & Vissers 2008).  Teenagers can seek information on health and 
sexuality issues in a discreet fashion, especially regarding topics that might be awkward or 
uncomfortable to discuss face-to-face (Harvey et al. 2007).  Even risk in and of itself is not 
necessarily a problem – attempting to shield teenagers from any and all harm would rob them of 
essential life experiences and potentially hamper their ability to deal with “real world” 
challenges once they reach adulthood (Staksrud & Livingstone 2009).  On the other hand, it is 
entirely reasonable and understandable for parents and other authority figures to have an interest 
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in minimizing the severity of online risk, leading to the development of multiple forms of 
mediation.   
Forms of Mediation: Parental and Self 
Mediation, in this context, can be defined as “parental management of the relation 
between children and media... beyond simple restrictions to encompass also conventional and 
interpretive strategies” (Livingstone & Helsper 2008).  Mediation goes beyond pure boundary 
setting to include a variety of potential tactics for controlling, limiting, or mitigating the risks 
adolescents might encounter on the Internet.   
There are several sub-divisions of mediation that can be readily identified in the 
literature.  The first level is the break between parental mediation, in which the parents attempt to 
moderate a teen's activities, and self-mediation, in which the teens themselves attempt to regulate 
or control the degree of risk.  Within the realm of parental mediation, there are multiple possible 
vectors for control, which can be subdivided between those based on observation and those 
based on restriction.  Of the observation-based mediation methods, active mediation consists of 
parental discussion and interaction with the child during the process of engaging with the 
medium (Livingstone & Helsper 2008). A similar practice is evaluative mediation, in which the 
parent observes the child's activity, but does not necessarily comment on it; this runs the risk of 
implicitly approving of objectionable behaviors or content (Eastin et al. 2006). Restrictive 
methods are those where a parent attempts to directly or indirectly prevent access to potentially 
hazardous situations.  Restrictive methods take two forms: interaction restrictions, the setting of 
restrictions external to the computer itself – rules about time spent online, location of the 
computer, or sites/content that are not acceptable, while technical restrictions are those that rely 
21 
on the computer itself as a means of control; most commonly, software designed to restrict 
access to certain sites/content (“filters”) or designed to track teenagers' Internet use so that 
parents may review where their child has been (“monitors”) (Livingstone & Helsper 2008). 
Self-mediation, the ways by which teenagers themselves control and mitigate risk while 
online, is a relatively under-discussed area.  Teenagers are certainly savvy when it comes to their 
online experience, and have developed their own ways for negotiating potentially hazardous 
situations (Tynes 2007a).  Given the relative lack of focused research on teens' self-mediation 
skills, it is more difficult to create a typology, but self-mediation can essentially be divided into 
two categories; identity control and situation management.  Identity control refers to the ways 
that teens themselves choose which information they share and who has access to that 
information.  There is an intentional decision on the part of most teens as to what information is 
to be shared, and how; often based on the mode of communication, the goal of the 
communication, and even the structural differences between similar methods – for instance, the 
degree of anonymity allowed between two SNS (Livingstone 2008; Retelas 2008).  As noted 
above, certain aspects of identity are commonplace and readily shared, especially on SNS – age, 
sex, location, a photograph, etc.  However, teens may also modify or alter personal information 
for a variety of reasons, whether to experiment with new identities, to joke with peers, because 
they did not bother to include it in the first place, or perhaps most importantly, to hide from 
unwanted attention - especially parents (boyd 2007; Lenhart & Madden 2007).17  Sixty-two 
percent of teens whose parents were aware of their SNS profile reported setting their profiles as 
“Friends only,” compared to 46% of teens whose parents were unaware of their profile (Lenhart 
                                                 
17A popular website, Oh Crap. My Parents Joined Facebook, is dedicated to users' accounts of their parents 
engaging in “embarrassing” acts on the popular SNS (“Jeanne & Erika” 2009). 
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& Madden 2007:27).  Teenagers also use false data to bypass sites that require personal 
information as part of the registration process (Moscardelli & Divine 2007).  Fifty-six percent of 
teens with profiles report posting at least some false information, with eight percent claiming 
most or all of their profile is falsified (Lenhart & Madden 2007:23). Boys seem to be more likely 
to share false data, with 64% of boys reporting some degree of falsification compared to 50% of 
girls (Lenhart & Madden 2007:24).  This could be due to the differing reasons for SNS use 
detailed above – boys might “puff up” their presentation to appear more interesting to the girls 
they flirt with, while girls may value honesty amongst their friendship networks.  Age plays a 
role as well, with 69% of teens 12-14 reporting false information, compared to 48% of older 
teens (Lenhart & Madden 2007:24).  This is most likely related to the age restrictions on SNS; 
users under the age limit of 14 must lie about their age to gain access. 
Even if teenagers are entirely truthful with their online presentation, SNS often offer an 
extra layer of identity protection; profiles can be set to “private” or “friends only,” limiting 
access only to those users approved by the profile creator.  Thelwall (2008:1234) found that 
about 18% of a sample of MySpace users aged 16 and over had profiles that were set as 
“private,” while Lenhart & Madden (2007:26) found that 59% of teens said their profiles were 
only visible to friends, while another 40% said their profiles were visible to everyone.  While this 
would suggest a degree of identity protection, the act of Friending may be less about controlling 
access to data and more about the public display of social connections (boyd 2007; Thelwall 
2008).  As discussed above, some SNS users have hundreds of Friends, ranging from family 
members and significant others to distant relatives, casual acquaintances, and in some cases, 
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musical groups, celebrities, or even novelty profiles representing fictional characters (boyd 2009; 
Booth 2008).   
Furthermore, the binary nature of Friending is rather limiting once the initial control is 
applied – whether the profile is “friends only” or publicly visible, it is the same information 
(Preibusch et al. 2007).  In December 2009, Facebook massively restructured its privacy settings, 
but not without controversy.  While the new Facebook allows users to organize their Friends into 
categories that can then be assigned different levels of access to a user's profile, it also changed 
its definition of “publicly available” information.  Facebook users' names, profile picture, gender, 
location, school and work networks, and “fan pages” (an articulated statement of support or 
approval for a celebrity, company, cause, etc.) are all available for any visitor to view.  This could 
be problematic if a user is a “fan” of a controversial issue such as drug legalization and an 
unwanted visitor views such information (Paul 2009).   Even with the security changes, the 
process of assigning Friends into various categories is counter-intuitive at best and Byzantine at 
worst, prompting some third-party sites to set up “walk-through”-type guides (Driscoll 2009, 
Paul 2009).  While Facebook users can now determine on a post-by-post basis which Friends get 
to see their status updates, SNS remain “weak by design” when it comes to identity security; a 
user has to reveal pertinent information in order to be found by real-world friends, as well as to 
prove to Friends that they are who they claim to be (Schroeder 2008, Acquisti & Gross 2006:2).  
This weak privacy scenario may actually benefit SNS financially; after all, nobody goes to 
Facebook or MySpace to be left alone.  The entire point of SNS is sharing information with an 
audience, and too much privacy would remove the panoptic appeal of the site.  The less 
appealing the site, the less money the site's owners stand to make.  Essentially, Facebook (and by 
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that virtue, other SNS) need users' private information to keep the rest of the user base coming 
back (boyd 2010).   
This raises a specific question about SNS – if the site's business model is hinged on 
monetizing access to users' personal information and other user-created data, then who actually 
owns that information?18  Facebook's “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities” claims that 
Facebook has the right to use any “IP content” (photos, videos, and other materials covered 
under intellectual property law) as they see fit, worldwide, until that content is deleted (facebook 
2009a).  Facebook recently sued the creators of “Web 2.0 Suicide Machine,” a site that allows 
users to remotely “kill” their Facebook, Myspace, LinkedIn and Twitter accounts, claiming that 
the program's ability to log into Facebook users' profiles on their behalf is a violation of 
Facebook's terms of use (Hoover 2010; McNamara 2010). 
The second aspect of self-mediation, situation management, concerns the ways teens 
react when they are presented with a risky scenario.  In the case of stranger contact, blocking the 
stranger from further contact, rebuffing the stranger's advance, or reporting the incident to an 
authority figure are all considered “appropriate” responses (Rosen et al. 2008; Staksrud & 
Livingstone 2009).  On the other hand, the suggested appropriate response for issues of identity 
vulnerability is simply to remove the vulnerable data or to limit access to it (i.e., by setting a 
profile to “private”) which, as noted above, can be a complicated process (Moreno et al. 2009b).  
Identity vulnerability is at its core an identity control issue, although there are potential cases 
where situation management might come into play, such as a teenager finding their personal data 
                                                 
18In at least one case, an online community has abandoned a site over the monetization of user-created content; in 
2008, editors of a wiki dedicated to the Transformers toy robot line left their for-profit hosts and recreated the 
entire site on a private server following a heated and public disagreement about advertising placement 
(Finkelstein 2008; TFWiki.net 2008). 
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in an unexpected and unwanted venue, or more likely, a website requesting information the user 
is not willing to part with.  Teenagers who perceive the sharing of personal data as risky are less 
likely to provide such information when prompted (Youn 2005).19  Their management strategies 
in such situations reflect back to the issue of identity control – teens either falsify data, provide 
incomplete data, or simply leave the site altogether (Youn 2005).    
Again, teenagers are certainly aware of the risks of Internet use, and clearly take steps to 
maintain their own safety.  Teens whose profiles contain “all” or “most” false data feel they are 
less likely to be identified by their profile than their peers who just have “some” or “very little” 
false data (Lenhart & Madden 2007:26).  Overall, the strongest predictors of a teenager's concern 
for their online privacy appear to be their own frequency of internet use and the level of parental 
communication (Moscardelli & Divine 2007). 
Both parental and self mediation strategies have their shortcomings, however.  Several 
studies found that less than half of parents offered any form of  mediation, and the techniques 
used were limited in effectiveness, if not outright ineffectual (Livingstone & Helsper 2008; 
Rosen et al. 2008).  Even in situations where parents do attempt to mediate teens' Internet 
experiences, the most obvious problem is the potential disconnect in awareness of limitations – 
attempts at interactive restrictive mediation can only be effective if the child is aware of the rules 
(Livingstone & Helsper 2008).  Multiple studies present exactly such a disconnect; while parents 
reported a set of rules or limits on Internet behaviors, their children did not (Liau et al. 2005; 
Wang et al. 2005).  Older teenagers reported far fewer restrictions on Internet use, as did 
teenagers who had Internet access in their bedrooms (Livingstone & Helsper 2008; Rosen et al. 
                                                 
19Conversely, if teenagers perceive some benefit to the disclosure, their willingness increases considerably (Youn 
2005). 
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2008; Wang et al. 2005).  Indeed, one study suggested that teenagers who identify as highly 
skilled at Internet use were more likely to engage in certain forms of risky behavior (e.g., 
stranger contact, viewing of inappropriate material) than their peers (Livingstone & Helsper 
2008).   
Self-mediation has its limitations as well; some teenagers are simply not as technically 
adept as their peers, and may have a hard time moving SNS profiles into a protected status, while 
others may lack the skills or savvy needed to deal appropriately with risky encounters 
(Livingstone 2008).  While it is heartening to see that teenagers are handling potentially risky 
situations in appropriate ways, it still smacks of closing the barn door after the horses have 
escaped; these risky scenarios may well never have happened if the teenagers had been more 
judicious in their identity control strategies.  On the other hand, holding teens overly responsible 
for receiving unwanted attention might be a case of blaming the victim, especially when the vast 
majority of teens handle risky situations in a thoughtful and reasonable manner.  The problem 
with identity vulnerability comes about because, as discussed above, the boundaries for what is 
acceptable and unacceptable sharing of information seems to vary between contemporary youth 
culture and the norms of mainstream society – while teenagers may know how to handle stranger 
contact, cyberbullying, or the presentation of unwanted content, identity vulnerability is largely a 
peer-motivated problem.   
Overall, the literature clearly demonstrates that there is a need to further explore what 
teenagers are doing online, both on SNS and in a more general sense.  In the next chapter, I 
address some critical questions from a theoretical perspective – what is the influence of offline 
social networks on teens' online behavior?  What social factors influence teens' decisions to use 
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SNS versus other forms of CMC?  Why do they persist in risky identity activity, even when they 
seem to be aware that their information could be compromised?  What, exactly, do they gain by 
doing all of this?  What can parents do to prevent these risks, if anything?  By applying a 
combination of symbolic interactionist, postmodern, and developmental psychological thought, I 
can begin my search for answers. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Theoretical Approach 
Generally speaking, the social science literature regarding online identity formation and 
management tends to draw from two schools of thought; the sociological theories of Erving 
Goffman and developmental psychological concepts based on the work of Erik Erikson.  
Additional insight has come from postmodern thought, particularly interpretations of Michel 
Foucault.  I will attempt to fuse these disparate conceptualizations into a single, holistic overview 
of adolescent online activity and identity risk.  This model will reflect the influence of teens' 
offline social networks on their online activity, as well as  means by which teens and their 
parents can mitigate potential risks. 
Goffman & Self-Presentation 
 Erving Goffman's dramaturgical sociology (1959) provides an excellent framework for 
approaching Internet communication and online identity formation.  Simply put, Goffman's 
thesis is that every social interaction is predicated to some degree in a process of impression 
management.  When around other people, an individual will act in a manner that is designed to 
present an impression that is useful to that individual's interests.  To this end, people tailor their 
appearance, actions, mannerisms, and so forth to present the best possible impression.  Within 
this realm of impression management are a host of motives; the confidence artist hoping to 
swindle a widow uses the same general tricks, tactics, and techniques as a teenaged boy hoping 
to impress his date; the con artist is perhaps less altruistic in his motives, but the staging is 
nonetheless similar.  While Goffman died in 1982, well before the popularization of CMC, his 
theory still resonates; perhaps even more so now.   
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 The business of impression management can be thought of in terms of two types of 
expressions – those that are “given” or deliberately manipulated, and those that are “given off” or 
(at least seemingly) unintentional (Goffman 1959:7).  “Given” expressions are largely under the 
control of the performer; the spoken or written word, the style of dress, the manner of bearing, 
and so forth, while “given off” expressions are generally uncontrolled and often unconsidered; a 
nervous stutter, an accent, a shaky hand, all the various and sundry “tells” that gamblers use to 
their advantage - they can be feigned, but are more often taken for granted.  These unintentional 
expressions are critical to face-to-face interaction for Goffman, as they provide an audience with 
some means of potentially discerning the validity of a given performance.  Given that so much of 
Internet communication is directly controlled by the user, the opportunity to observe “given off” 
expressions in online communication is extremely limited, even accounting for the availability of 
web-conferencing software.  This intense control over one's own expressive activity also means 
that identity management on the Internet is almost fully in the hands of the performer; an 
audience can only see the expressions that are selected for them.  Indeed, Internet users have 
gone to some lengths to generate stand-ins for non-verbal cues such as vocal tone; consider the 
“emoticon,” a symbolic tool to represent humor, displeasure, etc. in text-based conversation 
(Derk et al. 2008; Lo 2008). 
 Traditional websites, while relatively one-sided, are an excellent example of this aspect 
of Goffman's theory.  Walker (2000) divides web pages into two categories - “extrinsic” pages, 
used by creators to support off-line activities or networks (keeping in touch with friends, sharing 
links with peers) and “intrinsic” pages, those that are used by creators to address the Internet at-
large.  Extrinsic sites are targeted towards people the creator already knows, while intrinsic sites 
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are “overtures aimed at unknown audiences” (Walker 2000:107).  In either case, the essential 
presentation found on traditional websites is similar – some personal information, some images, 
some links to other websites, and some means for delivering feedback – a guestbook or e-mail 
account (Dominick 1999; Walker 2000).  Images, links, and other visual effects allow website 
creators to generate visual cues to replace the lost non-verbal ones; they are calculated displays 
of the creator's intended self-presentation (Papacharissi 2002).  Flashing lights, wildly colored 
text in odd fonts, and the like all display a certain creativity, while a simple and understated 
website in muted tones might reflect a more professional attitude.  A serious website might be 
identified as a “web page” or “personal site” while a more casual one is dubbed a “forbidden 
zone,” “lair” or “crap” (Dominick 1999:654).  All of these visual and textual cues allow a creator 
to display specifically targeted aspects of their personality, as well as serving to lure in visitors 
who share the creator's interests (Dominick 1999; Papacharissi 2002; Walker 2000).  
Furthermore, the displaced nature of websites means that it is quite easy for a creator to make 
statements about their identity, and relatively difficult for audiences to refute or disprove such 
statements (Walker 2000).  Even in a situation where an audience member does not accept the 
creator's self-presentation, the visitor can simply ignore it and move on, while the creator can 
similarly ignore negative feedback (Dominick 1999).  Essentially, websites allow their creators a 
“carefully controlled performance... under optimal conditions” (Papacharissi 2002:644). 
 Goffman identified the social realm in which acts of impression management take place 
as a “front region”; traditionally this might be a classroom, office, or other place of business 
(1959:107).  Similarly, a “back region” would be the areas where performers prepare, rehearse, 
and manage their self-presentations before utilizing them in the front region; this might be a 
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teachers' lounge, the kitchen area of a restaurant, or other areas where audiences are generally 
not allowed to intrude (Goffman 1959).  These regions do not directly correlate with the common 
notion of “public” or “private” areas; a family's living room would be considered a private space 
in the traditional sense, but when that family entertains guests it would be a front region in 
Goffman's terms.  In such a case, the family are a team of actors portraying the role of “happy 
family,” the guests are the audience, and the living room is the stage on which the performance 
takes place.  This distinction is crucial to understanding how self-presentation works on the 
Internet. 
 Persistent forms of CMC, like the web sites discussed above, serve as a sort of fixed 
performance in a permanent front region; while the performer may be absent, the 
website/profile/post serves as a continual and consistent presentation of the self.  This 
performance can reach any audience, anywhere, anytime, as long as there is Internet access.  This 
is a great load off the creator, as traditionally impression management is a careful task requiring 
much effort, but the nature of CMC allows for far greater levels of image control than previously 
possible.  This is not to say that all on-line spaces are front regions – any form of CMC where 
the users identify as part of the same team or cohort and subsequently discard or minimize their 
self-presentation in favor of self-disclosure could be considered a back region.  Walker (2000) 
found that creators of extrinsic sites, those web pages that were meant to be used only by the 
creator and/or a closely chosen group of people, were surprised to imagine that anyone else 
might be interested in their presentation.  The creators of extrinsic sites in Walker's study viewed 
their sites as part of a back region, meant for consumption only by those who were part of the 
shared performance team of “family” or “friend network,” despite the fact that such sites could 
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be theoretically visited by anyone with Internet access (Walker 2000).  Clearly, the lines between 
“front” and “back” regions (and subsequently, between “public” and “private”) can quickly 
become blurred on the Internet, as the case of blogging demonstrates. 
 Papacharissi (2004) argues that blogs are designed for self-disclosure rather than self-
presentation, allowing the viewer access to the more mundane (yet simultaneously more 
intimate) details of the creator's day-to-day life.  For teenagers, blogs offer “an outlet for 
personal expression and reflection, as well as a way to communicate and connect with others” 
(Huffaker 2006:1).  As such, blogs seem to function as a Goffmanesque “back space,” a “behind 
the scenes” realm where the creator is more vulnerable and discusses the process of content 
creation (Trammell & Keshelashvili 2005:972).  However, while a blog may let “the performer... 
drop his front... and step out of character” (Goffman 1959:112), there is still an element of the 
front space inherent in the existence of the blog – while it is a demystifying of the blogger's 
virtual identity, the blogger is still making calculated decisions as to which aspects of her or his 
personal life to put on display.  Indeed, Trammell & Keshelashvili (2005) extensively discussed 
the means by which “A-list” bloggers (i.e., the most popular/most widely read creators) attempt 
to present their identity to their audiences, often via considerable self-disclosure.  These top 
bloggers readily reveal information such as full names, location, and even phone numbers; by 
doing so, they create a degree of (perhaps feigned) intimacy with their audience.20  In these cases 
it would seem that the blog is a front space manipulated to appear as a back space and this level 
of self-disclosure is simply part of the performance of blogger identity, at least amongst 
“celebrity” bloggers, although the same may not be true of the remainder of the blogging 
                                                 
20An application of this study to Twitter, the popular “micro-blogging” site used by many celebrities as a 
promotional vehicle, might prove fascinating. 
33 
community.  Huffaker's study of teen bloggers found that the majority reveal information such as 
first name (70%), age (67%), city/state location (59%) and some form of contact information 
(61%) (2006: 6).  These teens do not create pretend or fictitious identities; their blogs are 
“realistic” depictions of their creators (Huffaker 2006:9).  As such, blogs straddle the line 
between front and back areas, a situation that is critical to understanding the nature of self-
disclosure on SNS.   
 The individual SNS profile is very much a front region in Goffman's terms, or at least an 
aspect of one – it is the calculated presentation of the self the creator wishes to express.  But for 
teenagers as an aggregate population, SNS services are often treated as a back region - a place 
for teens to “hang out,” ostensibly far from the prying eyes of parents, teachers, and other 
authority figures (boyd 2007).  Teens' expectation of privacy on SNS is drawn from the site's 
perceived status as safe for self-disclosure, behind-the-scenes chatter, and displays of 
vulnerability amongst a team – the Friend network.21  Some SNS openly tout this status; 
MySpace's slogan is “A place for friends.”  The relationship between individual profile and the 
larger social network is thus complicated; teenagers use their SNS profiles to generate identities 
that are peer-appropriate and intended exclusively for the peer network.  In effect, the team and 
the audience are one and the same.   
 Adults and other unwanted guests are a form of what Goffman would term “outsiders,” 
they are not performers, and they are not the intended audience (Goffman 1959:144).  The 
presence of outsiders can severely derail a given performance, as the actors and audience must 
both scramble to maintain their assumed roles in the presence of unwelcome individuals who do 
not understand what they are witnessing.  However, as these outsiders often have an interest in 
                                                 
21The same is presumably true of adult users. 
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the performance for a variety of reasons, they may set up observation.  The nature of this 
observation can be thought of in terms of intrusiveness (i.e. how deep the observation goes) and 
obtrusiveness (i.e. how overt the observation happens to be).  A parent who creates an SNS 
profile and attempts to Friend their child to monitor their activity would be intrusive and 
obtrusive, while a marketing firm data-mining user profiles for research purposes without 
notification would be intrusive, but not obtrusive.  The “serial adder,” a user who Friends as 
many people as possible regardless of any actual connection, but never leaves comments or 
otherwise interacts with the resultant massive Friend network, would be obtrusive but not 
intrusive.  Much of the problem with adolescent identity risk on-line arises through teens' back 
region activity, intended only for their close peers, being observed by outsiders.   
 The SNS user's profile is a form of self-presentation; it serves as a stand-in for the creator 
in the particular digital world it inhabits (Booth 2008; Hinduja & Patchin 2008).  SNS users have 
multiple ways of maintaining their desired identity; the sharing of pictures, both of the user and 
of their Friends, allows users to make implicit statements about themselves and their peer 
networks beyond mere physical appearance – a user who wishes to appear as popular will post 
pictures that show their social side, while an introvert might post more solitary images, and 
barring an (intentional and calculated!) display of cheekiness, users will post the most flattering 
pictures possible (Sessions 2009; Zhao et al. 2008).22  By listing their interests and hobbies, users 
can present themselves in terms of their consumption habits, with many SNS profiles offering 
extensive lists of the owner's favorite musicians, books, television shows, and so forth (Zhao et 
                                                 
22The preponderance of SNS user self-portraits taken at a high exposure with the camera overhead and at arm's-
length has earned such photos the waggish nickname “MySpace Angles.”  Such photos are considered to 
accentuate a female's breasts and facial features while obscuring the rest of the body, a practice that some male 
users consider highly deceptive (Sessions 2009). 
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al. 2008).  This allows for self-presentation as part of a larger consumer culture; users who wish 
to identify with a particular “scene” can deliver an appropriate performance of taste, whether that 
taste runs towards “Gossip Girl” and pop music or towards NASCAR and country music.  
Finally, profile creators can directly describe themselves; most SNS profiles include an “About 
Me”-type category where users can provide as much or as little information as they see fit (Zhao 
et al. 2008).  By posting various information to an SNS profile, a creator can develop and 
maintain a rather thorough self-presentation; photographs identify the creator and her or his role 
in various social networks, a list of taste preferences locate the creator within a culture/sub-
culture, and self-disclosure statements allow the creator to have an ultimate say over how the 
entire presentation should be viewed.  Each profile is a representation of the creator as he or she 
wants to be seen by an audience – not exactly the creator's real-world personality, but not quite 
the sort of limitless “true self” promised by more anonymous communication methods; instead, 
the online profile represents a “hoped-for possible self” (Turkle 1995; Yurchisin et al. 2005:737). 
 Profiles are carefully designed and targeted for specific sites – a professional profile on a 
job-search site, a romanticized profile on a dating site, a casual profile on a social network site, 
and so forth (Booth 2008; Schau & Gilly 2003; Yurchisin et al. 2005).  Goffman calls this 
“audience segregation;” a form of situational control that allows a creator to know which role to 
perform at any given time –  the process by which a performer “segregate(s) his audience(s) so 
that the individuals who witness him in one of his roles will not be the individuals who witness 
him in another of his roles” (Goffman 1959:137).  The failure of Friendster, one of the earliest 
SNS, was blamed in part on audience segregation gone awry, as “users had to face their bosses 
and former classmates alongside their close friends” (boyd & Ellison 2007).  Friendster was 
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nominally set up as a dating site, operating under a sort of “strength of weak ties” concept – 
users could add their real-life friends, and then could browse those friends' real-life friends and 
so forth, with the assumption that people who had friends in common likely had interests in 
common, and would be more romantically compatible than a total stranger.  However, the sort of 
self-presentation an individual might use when seeking a romantic (or sexual) partner can often 
differ quite vastly from the self-presentation an individual might use around family, co-workers, 
or even close friends, and it was this failure of audience segregation that led to the site's eventual 
abandonment.  As another example, consider the case of Melinda England, an elementary school 
teacher from Tennessee.  England posted topless photographs of herself on one of her profiles; 
while England's breasts were covered, and the profile was only accessible to users 18 and over, 
well beyond the age of the students she worked with, the photos were reported to the school 
administration, causing an uproar that reached the national level (Nauert 2007; WVLT-TV 2008).  
In this case, England's attempt at audience segregation failed – the pictures were in a venue for 
making personal connections, and were intended to be seen by potential suitors, not by her 
employers or the parents of her students.  This created a situation of disconnect, as the parents' 
impression of how a teacher should behave was at odds with the impressions put forth by 
England's photographs.   
 Perhaps because of the potential risks of failed audience segregation, most users present 
fairly mundane versions of themselves.  For instance, Facebook profiles often include the 
creator's name, location, and likeness, and the Facebook user's audience consists of friends, 
classmates, relatives, and other acquaintances; there is no logical reason to present oneself in a 
way that is not socially acceptable when such a varied group of peers are privy to that display 
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(Westlake 2008).  Indeed, Goffman (1959) claimed that public presentations often highlight the 
existing norms of a society, and most online presentations would then be similarly normative.  
Even a presentation that untrained observers might find shockingly deviant is likely normative 
for a given social network: the MySpace profile of Jacob Robida, the Massachusetts teenager 
who attacked several men in a Massachusetts gay bar with a hatchet, then shot and killed a police 
officer, a female companion, and himself during the ensuing manhunt, featured Neo-Nazi 
signifiers as well as potentially violent images, but also hosted more mundane information such 
as “What kind of kisser are you?” and “what type of car are you?” quizzes (Levenson 2006; 
Robida 2006).  Aside from the Neo-Nazi material, much of the information on Robida's 
MySpace, while disturbing to the uninitiated, is par for the course amongst fans of the rap group 
Insane Clown Posse (who use the term “Juggalos” as a self-identifier); a cartoon figure wielding 
a meat cleaver is the logo of Insane Clown Posse's record label, while an ominous image of a 
bouncing axe with the caption “PASS THE AXE” encouraging readers to “get your hands bloody 
baby!” is a reference to song by a related artist, meant to be shared amongst fans as a statement 
of belonging to the Juggalo subculture (Dark Lotus 2004).23  While Robida's MySpace certainly 
had problematic content, made all the more troubling by his eventual actions, virtually all of the 
non-Neo-Nazi material might be found on the profile of any other member of the Juggalo 
subculture or any other user with “dark” or “gothic” leanings.  While the Juggalo signifiers might 
appear deviant to the eyes of society at large, they are simply a statement of in-group 
identification and as such, rather normative amongst that subculture.  Here I see further support 
                                                 
23Shortly after the incidents discussed above, Insane Clown Posse's label released a statement assuring the media 
that Robida was “out of his mind” and “anyone that knows anything about Juggalos knows that in no way... 
would we ever approve of this type of bullshit behavior” (Boyd 2006a).  These statements define an acceptable 
performance of Juggalo identity – strange, profane, and perhaps a little scary, but not murderous. 
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for Goffman's theory – even members of a deviant subculture will create performances that are 
normative within that subculture. 
The Influence of Foucault 
 Westlake (2008) fuses the Goffmanesque focus on identity management with the 
Foucauldian concept of surveillance.  In this context, SNS are a panoptic system – users are 
under constant observation, both by themselves in an identity management context as well as by 
the visitors to their profile who serve as an audience.  Where SNS differ from traditional 
surveillance systems is in their performative aspect; users have many ways to control and 
mediate their presentation – profiles can be changed, compromising materials can be altered, 
access limited, and so forth.  A certain degree of surveillance is expected, and perhaps even 
desired; why bother engaging in an identity performance if nobody is around to see it?  The 
desire for surveillance implies a degree of resistance as well; while adolescents want to be seen 
and known based on the identities presented on SNS profiles, they also want to have control over 
how those same identities are managed and constructed.  Livingstone mentions several such 
cases of resistance on SNS profiles – users who falsify profile data for comedic effect (a 13-year-
old boy claiming to be “36, married, living in Africa”) or who use pictures of their pets in lieu of 
an image of themselves (2008:399).  While these acts are also potentially viable as forms of 
identity management (as discussed above), the humorous exaggeration of the false statements 
also suggests an intentional subversion of SNS performance expectations. 
 There is also a complicating element of Foucauldian self-monitoring in the process – the 
profile is a representation of the creator, but it is mitigated and influenced by a perceived 
“imagined audience” consisting of both real peer expectations and a desire to be seen by 
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unknown potential parties as “well-rounded, sociable and fun-loving” (boyd 2007:14; Zhao et al. 
2008:1828).  Any deviation from these panoptic peer expectations could potentially result in 
negative feedback via comments or the dreaded unFriending.  In essence, while there is the 
potential for the SNS profile to be a transformative and fluid work, the processes of impression 
management and audience segregation mean the profile is not a completely honest assessment; 
the profile is altered to be socially acceptable, the creator intentionally limiting and constraining 
her or his identity in an attempt to appeal to the omnipresent peer network.  What could be (and 
was proposed by early Internet scholarship to be) a radical and liberatory opportunity for writing 
the self into existence is more likely to be just another form of internalized social control. 
The Developmental Psychological Approach 
 The other major social science perspective on adolescent Internet use approaches the 
topic from a developmental psychological framework.  One of the primary goals of adolescent 
development is to experiment with different behaviors and different possibilities to discover (or 
create) a “true” personality that “is simultaneously autonomous and socially valued... that 
balances critical judgment and trust, inner unity and acceptance of societal expectations” 
(Erikson 1963; Nurmi 2004; Livingstone 2008:397).  The Internet is one of many vectors for 
adolescent emotional and psychological development; by generating a virtual identity, 
adolescents also generate a real-world one as well.  The “hoped-for possible self” discussed 
above is an actual potential future identity for the creator; it is literally the self the individual 
wishes to become as an adult.  Teenagers can experiment with multiple potential identities in 
relative safety via the anonymity of the Internet, using online communities as sounding boards 
for their identity explorations (Valkenburg & Peter 2008).  These online spaces not only allow 
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for experimentation with new individuals, they allow for intimacy between peers in a shared (and 
presumed safe) space, a different form of identity exploration (Livingstone 2008). 
 In addition to providing a solid rationale for why teenagers use CMC in a general sense 
(i.e., identity formation and exploration), the developmental psychological literature also offers 
some interesting perspectives as to why specific types of teenager are more or less likely to 
engage with the internet in a given way, particularly as relates to a teenager's feelings of social 
connectedness.  The “rich-get-richer” (RGR) hypothesis suggests that adolescents who already 
have strong social skills and a dense network of off-line friends use the Internet to strengthen 
those existing friendships.  For these users, the Internet is just one of many ways to stay in touch 
with peers, with SNS in particular allowing teens to maintain a large network of friends 
(Steinfield et al. 2008).  The “social compensation” (SC) hypothesis suggests that teenagers who 
lack friends, especially those who are lonely or who have trouble communicating in person, turn 
to the Internet to make new friends.  The aforementioned lack of physical cues might also make 
it easier for these adolescents to communicate online (Valkenburg & Peter 2007; Valkenburg & 
Peter 2008; van den Eijnden et al. 2008).  These online friendships are, much like offline 
friendships, based primarily on some shared social status between peers, and while online 
relationships are sometimes perceived as weaker than offline ones, research suggests that they 
are not necessarily inferior, but simply different (Mesch & Talmud 2007). 
The developmental psychological literature to date tends to support the RGR over SC 
model, however, I would argue that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  While one 
study found that usage of instant messaging software was inversely proportional to loneliness 
(van den Eijnden et al. 2008), this simply suggests that well-connected adolescents use IM as one 
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form of contact with their peers, whereas less-connected teens might turn to message boards, 
chat rooms, or other forms of online communication.  Indeed, another study found that both 
hypotheses were supported; the rich-get-richer hypothesis was applicable to adolescents who 
primarily used the Internet to communicate with existing friends, while the social compensation 
hypothesis was applicable for those who explicitly used the Internet as a means of safe self-
disclosure (Valkenburg & Peter 2007).   Furthermore, “lonely” teenagers were more likely to use 
online communication to experiment with alternate identities (Valkenburg & Peter 2008; 
Valkenburg & Peter 2009).  Offline, these lonely teens were less socially engaged and had fewer 
close friends than their non-lonely peers, but online communication presented new opportunities 
to experiment with identities and practice their social skills.  This experimentation and 
exploration brought those teens into contact with a wide variety of people, which had a positive 
effect on their offline social competence – essentially, communicating with lots of different 
people online gave these teens the skills or the confidence needed to be more capable when 
communicating offline.  Among a sample of college students, Facebook use was shown to have a 
positive effect on the level of “bridging” social capital, suggesting that SNS usage in general will 
lead to increased social connections for the user, even (or especially) if that user had a low level 
of connectedness beforehand (Steinfield et al. 2008).  These connections will be relatively 
superficial, and could best be described as “weak ties,” but users will put forth considerable 
effort in their care and maintenance, suggesting support for both the RGR and SC models.  Some 
socially anxious adolescents avoid online communication altogether, suggesting the social 
compensation hypothesis is not completely supported, but even those teens are still interacting 
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with someone, somehow, online even if they are simply reading websites or playing single-
player games. 
The developmental psychological literature can be dovetailed nicely into both Foucault 
and Goffman; the performances teenagers carry out as presentations of a hoped-for possible self 
are also part of the process of psychological identity formation.  Successful performances are 
validated by peers (and internally validated by the actor), kept, and added to the repertoire while 
performances that fail are rejected, modified and attempted again at a later date.  Acceptable 
performances will fit within a culture's (or subculture's) normative expectations as the actor will 
often self-police, constraining her or his true desires to meet the expectations of the perceived 
audience.  The tactics and targets of online experimentation may vary depending on the 
adolescent's off-line network strength; teenagers with strong friendship networks engage in 
performances which reflect and reify their position amongst their peers, while teens with weaker 
friendship networks engage in more expressive performances to improve their communication 
skills and perhaps generate alternative social networks.  In both cases the “hoped-for possible 
self” that teens perform online is honed and refined, as the process of experimentation is part of 
the socialization into adulthood, as teens learn which roles and performances society will accept, 
and which ones society will reject.  Identity risks arise when teens' perception of SNS as a 
private area for communication and exploration amongst peers is compromised by external 
actors who are not the intended audience for these performances. 
Theoretical Model 
 This research examines the influence of teenagers' off-line social network strength on 
their on-line behaviors, most especially as relates to risk perception and identity vulnerability, 
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using a framework based on Goffman's concept of self-presentation and the developmental 
psychological literature on loneliness and Internet communication.  Working from Goffman, 
teens' online profiles serve as a form of self-presentation, an idealized representation of who 
teens claim to be.  Personal data is shared to reinforce this process of impression management.  
Furthermore, while individual teens use these profiles to engage with one another in a “front 
region” of calculated social action, teenagers as a group tend to view these venues as a “back 
region,” limited in scope only to their peer network, i.e., other teenagers they know; parents, 
authority figures, and unknown strangers are outsiders and implicitly, if not explicitly, 
unwelcome.  The developmental psychology literature suggests that teenagers' relative feelings 
of loneliness affect their online usage.  Non-lonely teens use the Internet to interact with their 
friend networks and reinforce those relationships, while lonely teens use the internet to explore 
their own identities and perhaps to generate new social networks.  Sociologically speaking, it 
would then make sense that teenagers' social networks would have a similar effect; well-
connected teens might use the Internet to reinforce existing offline friendships, while less-
connected teens might use the Internet to create new connections or relationships; the degree of 
anonymity provided by online communications as well as the relative ease of finding other users 
of similar social status makes it an ideal venue for exploratory contact (Mesch & Talmud 2007).   
I can then classify online social activity into two categories - “reinforcing” activities are exactly 
what the name implies; behaviors that reinforce existing friendships, while “exploratory” 
activities are those where the user is seeking new social connections.24  From there, I can classify 
different online social activities by their function – reinforcement or exploration. 
                                                 
24Another type of Internet activity would be “information-seeking” - again, the name is self-explanatory; teens using 
the Internet for academic study or personal edification.  While this may have a social aspect (e.g. a chat room 
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 Given that much existing research suggests that the primary purpose of adolescent SNS 
and IM usage is reinforcing in nature, I would expect to see higher levels of SNS and/or IM 
usage amongst well-connected adolescents (Ellison et al. 2007; Livingstone 2008; Steinfield et 
al. 2008).  Similarly, existing research suggests that adolescents who interact with strangers 
online are more likely to visit chat rooms, suggesting that these teens are potentially looking to 
make new social connections (Liau et al. 2005; Mitchell et al. 2008).  As such, I would expect to 
see higher levels of chat usage amongst less-connected adolescents.  I can also look at what I 
have broadly dubbed “content creation” usage, Internet activity forms in which the user creates 
original content to be shared with the Internet at large (as opposed to SNS, where the profile 
content is intended to stay within the confines of the SNS site and the creator's chosen Friends).  
These forms would include blogging, non-SNS website creation, uploading of photos and videos 
to non-SNS sites, and other forms of sharing something the adolescent has created with the 
Internet at large.25  By creating websites, videos, and blogs, less-connected youth can extend 
their exploratory activity – posting content dedicated to a topic is an attempt to contact other 
people who share the creator's interest, regardless of the actual topic (Papacharissi 2002; Schau 
& Gilly 2003).  Given that these forms of communication are inherently expressive, and their 
usage often serves to focus on one specific aspect of an individual's personality or interests, I 
believe that content creation will be more common amongst less-connected adolescents.   
 In either case, reinforcing and content creation usage has a great deal of potential for 
identity vulnerability risks.  SNS ask users to share their personal data as part of the membership 
process.  Chat room users may use personal data as a way to “break the ice” in conversation, 
                                                                                                                                                             
about health concerns), the primary goal of this activity is research. 
25This would not include the sharing/downloading of commercial music/films/software/etc., as the materials being 
transferred in those cases are not the original creations of the adolescent. 
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while blogs and personal websites might share vulnerable information as a way of displaying 
individuality and the creator's identity.  In any case, malefactors could gain access to personally 
identifying information, whether it is freely given, or obtained through social engineering 
methods like phishing.  Seemigly innocuous information can become deeply damaging in the 
wrong hands. 
 Working from the assumption that the strength of a teen's social network has an effect on 
how she or he communicates online, it is possible that how a teenager moderates their identity 
vulnerability is also influenced by their reasons for using the Internet.  Combining the varied 
perspectives on adolescent self-presentation on the Internet gives us a general explanation for 
potentially risky behaviors: teenagers' profiles are self-presentation testing grounds – they 
present themselves as they want to be seen by their peers, with a careful eye for detail.  The 
photographs must be as flattering as possible, the data given out must be appropriate, and the 
entire goal of the enterprise is to provide a sort of “highlight reel” of who the creator is; an 
idealized representation targeted for consumption by his or her peers.  Well-connected teens can 
use the profile to reinforce existing friendship connections, while less-connected teens can use 
their profile to explore their own identity and search for like-minded peers.  This profile is a 
performance of the hoped-for possible self;  any falsification is done for the sake of creating a 
more acceptable image, not out of an attempt to maliciously deceive.  The system is panoptic as 
well – the teens create their profiles for others to see, and spend countless hours updating, 
modifying, and playing with their own profiles, as well as those of their Friends – the profile is a 
relatively fluid performance that can be changed with ease, a text that can be written and 
rewritten as the creator's identity shifts.  The primary limitation on a user's performance are the 
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expectations of their peers, whether represented externally via deFriending, negative comments, 
or other 'drama' or internally through the creator's own self-policing as part of the process of 
audience segregation.  The entire process helps the creator further refine their own self-image, 
both by choosing aspects of their own lives to display or conceal as well as by allowing others to 
modify those presentations in order to represent or reify their own relationship to the creator.  
Unflattering photos, damaging information and the like can quickly be excised and the profile 
can be altered into something more appealing to the target audience.  The process of identity 
creation and impression management becomes both an individual gesture and a collaborative 
action.   
 These performances, while seemingly transgressive to adult audiences, are generally 
normative within the parameters of youth culture.  Teens' desires to present themselves in a 
manner acceptable to their peers leads to potentially compromising situations at least partially 
because teenagers view SNS as a secure venue for identity experimentation, with an expectation 
of privacy comparable to traditional communication methods.  In other worlds, teens are not 
acting in malevolence or ignorance, but plain old peer pressure; simply put, everybody else is 
doing it.  However, these sites are often far from secure; even via the Friending process, the 
ability to delineate clear levels of access is still complicated at best.  Identity risks arise from 
unwanted individuals' obtaining data that was meant to be shared with a specific group, of which 
the outsider is not a member.  When this content spreads beyond its intended audience, the 
consequences can be emotionally, socially, or even physically damaging to the creator, as 
discussed earlier. 
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 That being said, teenagers do actively attempt to control and manage the amount of 
identifiable material they release on-line.  The sharing of data is an important part of the self-
presentation process, as this personal information serves to verify the user's identity – posting a 
photograph, real name, address, etc. allows a user to back up their claims about who they really 
are off-line.  For reinforcing users, personal information is an immediate and effective form of 
verification – your offline friends can find you online by searching for your name.  Photos of 
yourself and your friends then further confirm that you are indeed who you say you are, and that 
the relationships you claim with other users are in fact real (Livingstone 2008).  Vulnerable data 
is posted to show inclusion in a peer group, as a way of proving that the poster belongs in that 
particular realm.  Conversely, for exploratory users, personally identifying data serves as a form 
of self-disclosure amongst peers, a show of trust.  By sharing your name and photo with a 
relative stranger online, you reaffirm and strengthen your connection, and give added weight and 
credence to your statements.   
 In either case, a teen's degree of social connection should influence their level of identity 
vulnerability; well-connected teens should theoretically post more information than their less-
connected peers, as maximizing the amount of data available makes it easier for offline peers to 
confirm their identities.  Less-connected teens might share less personal data, as that knowledge 
is reserved for those who have earned their confidence or trust; they let their online profiles 
speak for them otherwise.   
 It is also possible that the communication methods themselves play an influence in the 
degree of self-mediation – SNS profiles are practically expected to have a name, photograph, and 
location, for instance, while chat or message boards can remain relatively anonymous.   Even 
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within the different SNS communities, there are varied expectations of self-disclosure, as 
discussed above.  Another factor to consider when discussing self-mediation would be risk 
perception – teens who perceive the Internet as more dangerous or hazardous than their peers 
will likely have higher levels of self-mediation.  The effect of self-mediation on identity 
vulnerability seems obvious; teens with higher levels of self-mediation will have lower levels of 
identity vulnerability, and vice versa.  The final factor to consider when discussing teens' identity 
vulnerability is the influence of parental mediation factors – while parental mediation seems to 
have a relatively limited effect on teens' online behaviors, it must be included in any model, if 
nothing else, for the sake of thoroughness.26  In this model, parental mediation is introduced as 
an separate intervening variable, roughly contemporary with self-mediation.  By placing parental 
mediation at the same stage in the model as self-mediation, I can test the relative effectiveness of 
one against the other. 
FIGURE ONE: Theoretical Model 
HIGH  REINFORCING 
RISK 
PERCEPTION   
^ ^ v 
STRENGTH OF SOCIAL 
NETWORK > 
ONLINE COMMUNICATION 
METHODS >
SELF-
MEDIATION >  
IDENTITY  
VULNERABILITY
v v 
LOW  EXPLORATORY 
PARENTAL 
MEDIATION >   
 Figure One is a visual representation of my theoretical model: Teenagers' relative levels 
of network strength will directly affect their choice of on-line communication methods.  Teens 
with high levels of network strength will primarily use SNS or instant messaging, methods that 
                                                 
26While the influence of parents' perception of the Internet as a risk-filled environment would be interesting to use as 
an independent variable for parental mediation, the lack of variables testing parental risk perception in the data 
set precludes such an investigation. 
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reflect their desire to reinforce existing social networks.  Conversely, teens with low levels of 
network strength will tend to utilize content creation-based methods in order to expand their 
social networks further.  This is not to say that there will be no overlap –  isolated teens use SNS 
as well, and there is no reason that highly connected teens could not engage in content creation.   
The choice of online communication methods also influences to some degree how teens mediate 
their behavior online, as different methods call for or allow differing levels of identity disclosure 
(Livingstone 2008).  Various forms of CMC have different normative expectations of identity 
disclosure; SNS generally want at least a first name, photograph and location, while chat rooms 
and message boards can be completely anonymous outside of the user's IP address.  These 
expectations would logically influence a given user's level of self-mediation.  Behavior 
mediation is also affected by teens' perceptions of the Internet as a potentially risky environment.  
This self-mediation has a direct effect on teens' level of identity vulnerability, which is also 
affected by the parents' attempts at mediating teens' Internet usage.  This model potentially 
explains many of the questions raised in Chapter 1.  In the next chapter, I will apply the Pew 
Internet and American Life Project data set to my model. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Data, Measurements and Hypotheses 
 The overall question of my research is deceptively simple: why do teens engage in risky 
identity displays online?  Actually getting an answer, however, is a much more complicated task.  
Chapter 1 dissected the problem, looking at the ways teenagers use the Internet and the potential 
for risk.  While teenagers may not see any problems with posting compromising information on 
the Internet, seemingly harmless information can become quite dangerous when in the wrong 
hands.  In Chapter 2, I constructed a theoretical model of teenage Internet use, risk management, 
and identity vulnerability.  These risky behaviors are part of a process of self-presentation and 
identity formation, and the ways teens present themselves are strongly connected to the ways 
they want to be seen by their peers, whether online or off.  By measuring teenagers' offline social 
network strength, I can determine if there is any effect on their online activities, and from there, 
their dealings with risk on the Internet.   
Data Set 
 In this chapter, I plan to create a testable version of the theoretical model, using data from 
the Parents and Teens 2006 Survey carried out by the Pew Internet & American Life Project.  
The dataset consists of interviews with 935 12-17 year olds living in the continental United 
States, as well as a parent of each teen.  Interviews were done in English by Princeton Data 
Source, LLC between October 23 and November 19, 2006 (Pew Internet and American Life 
Project 2006).  The sample was designed to represent teens living in the continental U.S. in 
households with telephones.  The sample is also designed to be representative of parents living 
with teenaged children.  The margin of sampling error for the complete data set is ±3.7% (Pew 
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Internet and American Life Project 2006:25).  This means that in 95 out of any 100 samples 
drawn using methodology identical to PIAL's, proportions estimated from such a sample will be 
no more than 3.7 percentage points away from the true value in the population.  As an example, 
93% of the teenagers in the sample said they used the Internet (Pew Internet and American Life 
Project 2006:6).  If this study was replicated 100 times using the same sampling methods, in 95 
out of the 100 samples the percentage of teens who report using the Internet would be between 
89.3% and 96.7% of the samples in question.   
 The PIAL sample was obtained using random digit dialing (RDD).  There are known 
liabilities when using RDD, from both a sampling and a response perspective.  The most obvious 
sampling concern is non-representation; households without telephones are by default not going 
to be sampled.  Current estimates suggest that about 2% of U.S. households have no telephone 
service whatsoever (Blumberg & Luke 2009:3).  Cell phones provide another series of problems: 
approximately 20% of U.S. households have no landline and use a cell phone as their only 
method of telephone service (Blumberg & Luke 2009:2).  Sixty percent of households consisting 
of adults living with unrelated roommates were wireless-only, as well as 39% of adults renting 
their homes, 41% of adults between 25-29, and 30% of adults living in poverty (Blumberg & 
Luke 2009:3).   These individuals may be missed in RDD research, as federal law prohibits the 
use of automatic dialing systems when calling cell phones, so any survey including cell phone 
users must be dialed by hand, a much more time consuming process (Pew Research Center for 
People & the Press 2006).  Furthermore, some cell phone numbers may have been ported over 
from an existing land-line, and would appear in a block of phone numbers assumed to consist 
solely of land-lines, creating further problems (Battaglia et al. 2005; Kulp 2004).  As such, many 
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RDD designs limit their sample to households with land-lines, treating cell phones as invalid 
(Battaglia et al. 2005).  Even when households with cell phones are sampled, households with 
more than one voice line (such as for a teenager or a home office) have a higher chance of being 
sampled than those with a single line, which could result in a skewing of the sample (Merkle & 
Langer 2008).  As of December 2008, 59.6% of U.S. households have both landlines and 
wireless telephones, which creates serious concerns for sampling bias (Blumberg & Luke 
2009:5).   
 The sampling frame for this data set was drawn from previous Pew projects in 2004, 
2005, and 2006; households that reported having children under 18 in previous studies were 
called back and screened for 12-17 year olds.  The original sampling frame was obtained from 
Survey Sampling International and gathered according to Princeton Survey Research Associates 
International specification (Pew Internet and American Life Project 2006).  In this case, the PIAL 
sample used physical dialers, and as such includes households with cell phones.  While this does 
create problems with multi-line households having a higher likelihood of being sampled, as 
discussed above, it also avoids the problem of entirely missing wireless-only households.  As 
many as ten attempts were made to contact each sampled telephone number.  Calls were 
staggered through various times of day and days of the week to maximize the potential of 
making contact.  Each number received at least one daytime call.  Respondents were first 
screened to determine if a 12-17 year old lived in the household.  Households without children 
were marked as ineligible.  In eligible households, interviewers first spoke with a parent or 
guardian, then interviewed the target child.  In households with more than one child, the child 
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was chosen at random.  The response rate is 46% according to American Association for Public 
Opinion Research standards (PIAL 2006:25).27 
 To control for nonresponse bias, PIAL used sample balancing, also commonly known as 
raking, to weight the data set.  Sample balancing is commonly used when working with 
telephone surveys, as it is a generally accepted means of dealing with nonresponse bias 
(Battaglia et al. 2004a).  In the sample balancing process, known parameters of the population 
are used as controls and the sample is repeatedly weighted until the sample's parameters match 
those of the population, which is known as convergence (Battaglia et al. 2004b).  In most cases, 
socioeconomic and demographic data are used as the population control standards, with the goal 
being that the demographic makeup of the weighted sample should closely approximate that of 
the target population (Battaglia et al. 2004b).  One known issue with sample balancing comes 
about when two closely correlated variables are used as controls, for instance, eligibility for food 
stamps and poverty status (Battaglia et al. 2004b).  In such cases, convergence may never be 
reached as the weighting process simply continues ad infinitum (Montaquila et al. 2003).  Given 
that the PIAL data set weighted parents on sex, age, education, race, Hispanic origin, marital 
status and U.S. Census region, while children were weighted on gender and age, this was not an 
issue.  The control parameters came from 2005 U.S. Census Bureau data covering all continental 
U.S. households with a telephone.28  A complete list of the sample demographics, their weighted 
versions, and the population control totals is available in Appendix A. 
                                                 
27While there has been a significant decrease in response rates for RDD phone surveys over the last fifteen years, 
research suggests that RDD data is still generally representative of the population, and that studies with response 
rates around 30 percent are functionally similar to studies with response rates around 60 percent (Fowler 2009). 
Previous Pew surveys have had response rates as low as 22 percent (Keeter, et al. 2006). 
28The exclusion of non-telephone households from the population is obviously problematic, for reasons discussed 
above. 
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 Perhaps the biggest difficulty when using a pre-existing data set is they are gathered to 
answer a particular set of questions, which may not necessarily be the same questions the 
secondary analyst is interested in (Friedman 2007).  Even if a survey is nationally representative, 
properly designed, and rigorously coded, survey items still may not precisely measure the 
concepts a secondary analyst has in mind, and an existing data set rarely covers all the variables 
a researcher is interested in (Kiecolt & Nathan 1985:13).  Another issue is the quality of the data 
set itself; while PIAL extensively documents its recruitment process, interview method, response 
rate and margins of error, other existing data sets are sometimes not as thorough in their 
descriptions, leading researchers to put too much faith into their data (Sales et al. 2006). 
 Analysis of existing data has its advantages as well.  One admittedly crass but 
nonetheless valid rationale for using existing data is the very low cost and effort involved in 
gathering the data, making it ideal for testing new hypotheses or alternate methods of analysis 
(National Institute of Health 2003; Sales et al. 2006).  An exploratory analysis such as this one is 
better served by initially using existing data to quickly test a theoretical model, rather than going 
to the time and effort of generating a completely new research instrument, gathering an equally 
representative sample, carrying out the data gathering process, and so forth.  For an individual 
researcher working on a limited budget, producing a data set with the depth, breadth, and 
representative value of the PIAL data is highly unlikely (Kiecolt & Nathan 1985; Sales et al. 
2006).  Future applications of this research could certainly move forward with the testing and 
development of specialized scales and the like, but for now budget and time considerations 
preclude such advanced design work.  Indeed, given the rapid pace of development in CMC, by 
the time a more carefully-targeted instrument was ready for implementation, the population of 
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interest may well have already moved on to whatever the next communicative method happens 
to be.  Another advantage is the potential for future research; the 2006 Parents and Teens data set 
is a modification and replication of a survey carried out in both 2004 and 2000.  If PIAL were to 
replicate the study again in the future, it would be quite easy to modify this research for a 
longitudinal analysis of teens' online behaviors.   
Applied Model 
 Connecting the theoretical model from Chapter 2 with the PIAL data set requires some 
element of finesse in the measurements used.  As discussed above, an existing data set will rarely 
cover all the topics a researcher has in mind.  However, with some creative application of theory 
and the use of specific analytical techniques, the variables in the PIAL data approximate the 
model.  Measuring a degree of parental mediation is rather straightforward – count up the 
different ways a parent attempts to mediate a child's online experience, and the higher the score, 
the greater the degree of mediation; much the same is true of “identity vulnerability.”  However, 
several of the variables in the theoretical model, such as “risk perception” and “reasons for using 
the Internet” are quite abstract.  Risk perception, in and of itself, is an unobservable construct – it 
does not “exist” per se in the real world in the way that “parental mediation” or “online 
communication methods” does.  Constructs of this type are referred to as latent variables in the 
literature, and the process of analyzing one requires determining a statistical relationship 
between a set of observable variables that are taken to represent the presence or the influence of 
the latent variable (Borsboom, et al. 2003).   
 A latent variable is an unseen (and unmeasurable) force manipulating a set of observed 
variables; the problem is to find the appropriate observed variables to deduce the presence and 
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strength of the latent variable.  As an analogy, consider an individual who dresses as a “ghost” by 
covering herself with a bedsheet.  While the “ghost” is free to roam, it is not the bedsheet that is 
truly ambulatory – the person underneath is doing the work.  As the bedsheet covers the wearer's 
body, certain points where the body and the sheet make contact can be observed and measured – 
the top of the head, the ends of the fingers, the tip of the nose, and so forth.  By appropriately 
analyzing these points, I can then deduce who is under the bedsheet. 
 The process of analyzing these latent variables is a bit more complex than throwing a 
sheet over the data and poking away.  Measurable variables from the data set will be chosen as 
indicators based on their use in prior research on the topic and theoretical assumptions about 
their validity to generate reflexive models for the latent variables.  Reflexive models suppose the 
indicators are independent beyond the influence of the latent variable (Borsboom, et. al 2002; 
Edwards & Bagozzi 2000).  When I choose measurable variables to serve as indicators, I am 
making assumptions about the nature of my latent variable.  To stretch the “ghost” metaphor a bit 
further; I am measuring my bed sheet under the presumption that it is a person in disguise while 
it could in fact be a robot, a stack of highly acrobatic hamsters, or an actual supernatural entity.   
 As discussed above, using a pre-existing data set has its limitations, and a primary flaw of 
this set is that the questions pertaining to identity vulnerability were only asked of adolescents 
who have SNS profiles, excluding non-participatory teens.  As such, it is necessary to cut the 
applied model into two pieces, one focusing on offline network strength and its effects on online 
activities, using the sample of all teen Internet users; while the second focuses on risk perception, 
mediation, and identity vulnerability among teens with SNS profiles.  Both models still test the 
theoretical model, while working within the limitations created by the data set.  The result is a 
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shift in scope, first looking at a broader population of all online teens, then narrowing my focus 
to the realm of SNS and its users. 
 The first model is shown in Figure Two.  A sociological adaptation of the developmental 
psychological literature would suggest that teenagers who have strong off-line social networks 
will tend to use the Internet to reinforce said networks.  Conversely, teenagers with limited off-
line social networks will largely use the Internet for exploratory purposes, whether to experiment 
with their own identity or to generate on-line social networks based on some shared interest. 
FIGURE TWO: Influence of Social Network 
REINFORCEMENT 
v 
HIGH SNS/IM 
^ ^ 
STRENGTH OF SOCIAL NETWORK > ONLINE COMMUNICATION METHODS 
v v 
LOW  CONTENT CREATION 
^ 
EXPLORATION 
 
 H1a: Respondents who are highly connected to off-line social networks will have a  
greater likelihood of using reinforcing communications methods. 
 H1b: Respondents who are weakly connected to off-line social networks will have a 
greater likelihood of using exploratory communications methods. 
 Theoretically, the choice of on-line communications methods has an influence on a user's 
level of self-mediation.  Here I strike a roadblock – the questions in the PIAL data set regarding 
self-mediation were only asked of teenagers with SNS profiles.  As such, my model testing the 
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effects of risk perception and mediation on identity vulnerability must be limited to those 
respondents.  Reinforcing methods seem to require a sharing of personal data as a form of 
identity verification, with SNS users expected to provide a variety of information simply to have 
a normative performance. 
 Figure Three depicts my second model.  Identity vulnerability itself is a direct result of a 
teenager's attempts at self-mediation.  Teens who maintain a careful control over their online 
presence will presumably have lower levels of identity vulnerability than their peers.  It is logical 
to assume that teenagers who view the Internet as a risky environment are most likely to self-
mediate, as they likely feel they are in more danger than their less-worried peers.  Furthermore, 
attempts at mediating the online experience by parents may also have some effect on identity 
vulnerability. 
FIGURE THREE: Risk Perception, Mediation, Vulnerability 
RISK PERCEPTION > SELF-MEDIATION >  
IDENTITY VULNERABILITY
  
PARENTAL MEDIA-
TION >  
 
 H2: Respondents who perceive the Internet with high levels of potential risk will have a 
higher  level of self-mediation. 
 H3a: Respondents who report a high level of self-mediation will have a low level of 
identity vulnerability. 
 H3b: Respondents who report a high level of parental mediation will have a low level of 
identity vulnerability. 
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 H3c: Self-mediation will have a stronger effect on respondents' degree of identity 
vulnerability than parental mediation. 
 Once the models are run on the data, I expect to see the following results: respondents 
with high social network strength will tend towards reinforcing online methods such as SNS and 
IM, while respondents with lower network strength will tend towards exploratory methods like 
blogging, website creation, and so forth.  Risk perception will have a positive, but minor 
influence on self-mediation.  Finally, both self-mediation and parental mediation will have a 
negative influence on identity vulnerability, but self-mediation will have the stronger influence 
of the two.  In my theoretical model, the connection between choice of online communication 
method and self-mediation is more strongly articulated.  If both models produce promising 
results, it would be possible to retest with only the SNS-using respondents. 
Measurements 
 Given the use of a preexisting data set and the inherent suppositions required as part of 
the process, there will be an element of finesse involved in the identification of latent variables in 
this research; however, given the exploratory nature of the study and the theoretical strength of 
the model itself, I feel the indicators chosen are those which will provide the best possible fit.  
Where applicable, I plan to engage in exploratory factor analysis to refine my latent variables.  
The variables I am looking at, and the survey questions I intend to use as indicators are as 
follows: 
 Strength of Social Network: Table One displays the two sets of questions that potentially 
offer insight into the respondents' social networks.  The first series serve to measure the 
respondent's participation in organized activities, which would expose the participant to a large 
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network of potential off-line friends.  The second series attempts to more directly measure off-
line peer-to-peer contact, focusing on the respondents' frequency of social interaction, whether in 
person or over the phone.  Neither series actively attempts to count the number of friends a 
respondent has, or the relative feelings of closeness between friends, but I would argue that a 
combination of exposure to many people via participation in group activities and frequent 
contact with peers in a variety of methods would suggest a strong social network.  In this case, 
higher frequencies of time spent with friends and positive acknowledgements of social activities 
participated in would indicate a higher degree of offline social network strength. 
 Online Communication Methods:  Multiple sets of questions in the PIAL data address the 
sorts of activities teenagers engage in online.  For my model, I plan to use a mix of questions that 
concern communication methods and content creation methods, as seen in Table Two.   
These questions cover SNS and IM, the two methods most commonly identified as being used 
for reinforcement, as well as content creation methods, which I believe will be more popular 
amongst exploratory users.  In addition, I included questions about chat rooms and gaming, 
largely for exploratory purposes.  I discarded questions related to information seeking and 
content consumption, preferring to focus strictly on forms of communication.  In this case, these 
questions serve a dual purpose – they are measurements in and of themselves of the sorts of 
activities teens engage in online, as well as acting as manifest indicators for the latent variable 
“Reasons for Internet Use.”  Effectively, by identifying specific methods as exploratory or 
reinforcing, I can then extrapolate that teens who participate in those methods do so for 
exploratory or reinforcing reasons. 
61 
 Risk Perception: Table Three covers questions which address teens' perception of the 
Internet as a risky environment.  The first question is limited only to those teens with SNS 
profiles, and regards their perceived risk of discovery via information on their profile, while the 
other two questions are more general and concern non-identity related risks.  However, it would 
follow that teens who identify any part of the Internet as a greater potential risk than the real 
world would likely identify other parts of the Internet as risky.  In this case, “risk perception” 
would be a latent variable with the identified questions serving as indicators. 
 Self-Mediation:  The questions in Table Four measure some degree of adolescent users' 
attempts at self-mediation.  These questions were only asked of respondents who reported having 
SNS profiles, creating an obvious limitation – I am in the dark, so to speak, as pertains to self-
mediation amongst other users.  Regardless, users who report controlling access to their profiles 
or creations would be considered to have higher levels of self-mediation than respondents who 
did not limit access. 
 Parental Mediation: The PIAL data set asked both teenagers and parents to discussion the 
level of parental mediation in the respondent's household.  Research suggests that teens' 
awareness of parental mediation is a more significant predictor of effectiveness than parental 
statements about mediation (Liau et al. 2005; Livingstone & Helsper 2008; Wang et al. 2005).  
As such, I primarily use questions asked of the child, supplemented by some questions asked by 
the parent, as shown in Table Five. All of the questions discuss in some fashion parental rules 
about computer use, whether explicitly stated orders not to do something, the use of software 
barriers, or the more indirect issue of computer location.  As such, all of these questions are 
considered to address restrictive forms of parental mediation.  This is a limitation of the data; as 
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there is a lack of questions concerning parents' use of active or evaluative forms of mediation.  
Regardless, the higher the number of positive responses regarding mediation techniques, the 
higher the level of perceived parental mediation.  For the question on computer location, having 
the home computer in an open family area is considered a positive response. 
 Identity Vulnerability: Finally, the data set contains a series of questions concerning the 
types of information teenagers post to their social network profiles, as listed in Table Six. These 
questions were only asked of teens who have SNS profiles, limiting their effectiveness when 
discussing all online teens.  The questions include such common information as a personal 
photograph and first and last name, as well as more inherently problematic data such as home 
address and phone number.  As discussed earlier, while much of this information is normative in 
SNS culture, any or all of these pieces of data can potentially be risky when accessed by 
unwanted viewers.  The higher the number of “yes” responses, the higher the respondent's level 
of identity vulnerability. 
Implications 
 The implications of my research are theoretically striking; if there is a connection 
between offline network strength and online communication, this will give Internet youth safety 
advocates a clearer picture of the potential risks at hand.  For example, attempts at building 
safety awareness could be specifically targeted by communication method, based on the relative 
network strength of the average user.  Determining the influence of teenagers' perception of the 
Internet as a risky venue on their attempts to control their behavior is a similarly promising 
proposal, and confirmation that teens' self-mediation methods are more effective than parental 
mediation techniques could encourage parents to find new, more effective ways to mediate their 
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teens' online experiences, while further awareness of how, why, and when teens self-mediate 
could encourage concerted attempts to strengthen those self-mediation processes, encouraging a 
stronger control on potentially damaging information.   
 Conversely, a rejection of any or all of my hypotheses is still valuable information: if all 
on-line teens use the same communications methods, regardless of social network strength, then 
that would challenge much of the existing literature and potentially present new questions about 
how and why teens use the internet to communicate.  Furthermore, if parental mediation methods 
are more effective than teens' self-mediation, or if neither method was particularly effective, it 
would still suggest a need to reinforce both teens' and parents attempts at creating safe spaces on 
the Internet – that improved mediation methods are even more necessary than initially believed. 
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CHAPTER 4 – Popularity Model 
 Thus far I have discussed the theoretical and practical implications of studying teenagers' 
online activity using a data set collected by the Pew Internet and American Life Project (PIAL).  
In this chapter I will actually apply the data to the model outlined in Chapter 3.  First, a refresher: 
the overall model is broken into two segments.  One, which will be covered below, tests the 
influence of respondents' offline social networks on their online communication methods.  The 
second, which is the focus of Chapter 5, investigates the relationship between respondents' 
perception of the Internet as a risky environment with their attempts at self mediation, as well as 
any attempts at parental mediation and personally identifying material being posted to a SNS 
profile.  Again, remember that I am working with two different models, due to the PIAL data set 
only asking respondents about IV sharing behavior on SNS, as opposed to across multiple forms 
of CMC. 
 In this chapter, I have two hypotheses (as depicted in Figure Two in Chapter 3).  First, 
hypothesis 1a, which suggests that respondents who are highly connected to offline social 
networks will have a greater likelihood of using reinforcing communications methods.  Second, 
hypothesis 1b, which suggests that respondents who have weak or limited connections to offline 
social networks will have a greater likelihood of using exploratory communications methods.   
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Method 
Sample 
 Using the PIAL data set of 935 teens, I cut the sample down to 735 respondents who self-
identified as using the Internet from home.29  Respondents were between the ages of 12-17 (M = 
14.82, SD = 1.685), 49.0% male and 51.0% female.  The teens were not directly asked about 
their racial or ethnic identity, however, 87.2% of respondents' parents identified as white and 
non-Hispanic, 5.5% identified as Black and non-Hispanic, 4.1% identified as Hispanic, and 2.9% 
identified as some other racial group.  Geographically, 21.5% of respondents lived in the 
Northeastern U.S., 28.3% lived in the Midwest, 30.2% lived in the South, and 20.0% lived in the 
West.  53.9% of respondents lived in suburban areas, while 21.9% were rural and 24.2% were 
urban. 
Dependent Variable 
 Communication Methods: I selected eleven variables to represent various online 
communication methods.  A principal components analysis loaded the items onto three factors 
roughly comparable to my proposed reinforcing/exploratory breakdown: the use of instant 
messaging and SNS loaded together on a factor, along with uploading photographs where others 
can see (which is logical, as photographs of the self and Friends are an important part of the SNS 
experience).  These variables all reflect a “reinforcing” use of the internet.  The creation of a 
personal webpage, a webpage for others, sharing something the user created and remixing 
something found online all loaded together, reflecting a “exploratory” paradigm.  Online gaming 
                                                 
29Excluding users without home Internet access becomes relevant in the next chapter, in which parental regulation of 
home Internet access is a significant part of the model. 
70 
and the use of chat rooms loaded onto a third factor.  This result was striking, but perhaps 
unsurprising; the way PIAL defined online gaming encompasses everything from highly-
competitive action games like Call of Duty 4 and Team Fortress 2 to casual cooperative games 
like Farmville and NeoPets, as well as single-player games that feature no interaction whatsoever 
outside of a “top scores” list.  It also includes dedicated gaming consoles such as the X-Box 360 
and Playstation 3 alongside traditional computer games.  Similarly, chat room functionality is 
available through multiple vectors; instant messaging services offer chat functionality, chat 
rooms can be implemented into personal websites, and many online gaming services offer chat as 
well.  Uploading videos and blogging did not load, perhaps because at the time the PIAL data 
was collected, the most popular video sharing sites were in their embryonic stages, and the 
concept of uploading videos was still relatively novel.  As for blogging, it can be implemented 
into both reinforcing and exploratory practices; many SNS offer some blogging capabilities, for 
instance.  Regardless, this allows me to create a more nuanced model, specifically testing 
reinforcing vs. exploratory usage.   
 Dropping gaming, blogging, uploading videos, and chat gives me two solid latent 
variables reflecting exploratory and reinforcing methods.  Given these results, I created two 
count variables and ran two separate regression analyses, testing my seven measurements of 
network strength against each activity variable.  The “reinforcing behaviors” scale has three 
indicators; use of instant messaging programs, use of social network sites, and the uploading of 
photographs where others can see.  This variable then ranges from 0 (none of these activities) to 
3 (all of these activities).  The “exploratory behaviors” scale has four indicators; creation of a 
personal webpage, creation of a webpage for others, sharing something created online, and 
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remixing something found online.  This scale ranges from 0 (none of these activities) to 4 (all of 
these activities).  Details of both scales are in Table Seven. 
Independent Variables 
 Offline Network Strength: I initially selected six variables to serve as indicators of offline 
network strength.   Four of these variables were yes/no questions regarding participation in 
various activities; school clubs, school sports, other school activities, and non-school activities.  
Two were scaled measurements of time spent engaging in specific forms of communication: 
talking to friends in person outside of school and talking to friends on a landline telephone.  A 
factor analysis showed that the six variables loaded onto three factors.  Individually, none of 
these factors had an acceptable alpha score to be used as scales (and a scale consisting of only 
two indicators is hardly worth considering in the first place).  As such, I decided to use all six 
variables in the model independently of each other.  While this may not be as theoretically 
satisfying as a single scale, data limitations are what they are.  Furthermore, testing many 
different measurements of “offline network strength” gives me a chance to check different 
patterns of behavior against each other.  Each one represents an alternate concept of “popularity” 
as well; students who participate in school clubs likely have different social networks than 
students who participate in school sports (eg. “jocks” versus “preps” or what-have-you), and 
theoretically any student with a social network would use the telephone to contact that network, 
regardless of activity participation. 
 Demographic variables: I also included some demographic data as control factors.  
Gender and age were chosen for their theoretical significance; previous literature has shown a 
clear relationship between age and gender and internet activity (Moscardelli & Divine, 2007; 
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Valkenburg & Peter, 2008).  Parental race was used as an admittedly questionable stand-in for 
respondent's race/ethnicity.30  Respondent's community type (urban/suburban/rural) and census 
region were included as well, primarily to test for any potential relationships; for instance, 
between urbanicity/rurality and Internet use (i.e., might users in rural areas use the Internet to 
connect with friends more than users in more densely-packed urban areas?).  Household income 
was reported by the parent and coded by PIAL into one of eight categories (less than 
$10,000/$10,000 to less than $20,000/$20,000 to less than $30,000/$30,000 to less than 
$40,000/$40,000 to less than $50,000/$50,000 to less than $75,000/$75,000 to less than 
$100,000/$100,000 or more).  In the initial data set, 73 cases (9.9% of the sample) were missing 
(i.e., “don't know/no answer”).  I attempted to restore the missing variables in SPSS both by 
adding the series mean and by using linear interpolation.  Both attempts yielded roughly similar 
results, so I chose to use the series mean cases.  In all cases except age and household income, 
the variables were recoded as dummy variables.  The reference categories for each variable were 
“male” for sex, “white” for parental race, “South” for Census region, and “suburban” for 
community type. 
Analytical Technique 
 In this data set, my dependent variables are straight counts of behaviors engaged in.  A 
respondent cannot “half” use SNS or “seventy five percent” create a website.  Either the activity 
is engaged in, or it is not.  This means my dependent variable is polychotomous and ordinal.  As 
such, the appropriate analytical technique is ordered logistic regression (OLR) (Long 1997). 
                                                 
30Obviously, parental race does not correlate 1:1 with a child's racial identity. 
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 To examine the effects of offline network strength on online activity, I estimated two 
OLR models.  The first model regresses content creation behaviors on all the variables discussed 
above, including demographic indicators for the child and one parent, as well as the 
measurements of offline network strength. The second model regresses reinforcing behaviors on 
the same variables.  The results of these analyses are presented in Table Nine. 
Results 
Exploratory Methods Model 
 Table Nine provides the results of the regression analysis for the exploratory methods 
model (M = 1.25, SD = 1.267).  The aim of this model is to assess the relationship between 
various measurements of teenagers' offline network strength and their use of exploratory 
methods.  By including the various control variables, I am able to determine whether there were 
any differences based on parental or respondents' demographics.  In this model, only three 
variables exhibit significant effects on exploratory behavior: household income, participation in 
school clubs, and time spent in person with friends.  Because this model is an ordered logistic 
regression, I must use the y*-standardized coefficients to interpret its meaning (Long 1997).  The 
y*-standardized coefficient indicates the effect on the dependent variable, in standard deviations, 
of a one-unit change in a given independent variable when all other variables are held constant.  
For example, participation in school clubs (a dichotomous variable) increases exploratory 
behavior by .194 standard deviations when all other variables are held constant.  For each 
bracket increase in household income, assuming all other variables are controlled, exploratory 
behavior decreases by .056 standard deviations.  Finally, for each reported increase in frequency 
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of time spent in person with friends, respondents' exploratory behaviors increase by .146 
standard deviations, when all other variables are controlled. 
 There are two indicators of fit for this model.  Ordered logistic regression inherently 
assumes that the slopes of coefficients are parallel at the threshold – in other words, that a model 
measures the likelihood of a respondent engaging in zero exploratory behaviors exactly as well 
as it measures the likelihood of a respondent engaging in all four exploratory behaviors.  This is 
called the “proportional odds assumption,” and it is tested using the Brant chi-square (Long 
1997).  A significant chi-square means that the model fails to meet the proportional odds 
assumption, and should be rejected.  The Brant chi-square for the first model is 79.12, well 
outside of significance.  As such, I can assume that this model accurately portrays the 
relationship it is purported to.  By looking at McFadden's R-squared, I can say that the model 
explains about 2% of the variance in exploratory behavior (R2 = 0.025) for the sample.  This is 
an admittedly small amount, and suggests that further research in the area is called for. 
Reinforcing Methods Model 
 Moving to the second model, five variables have significant effects on reinforcing 
behavior: respondent's sex, respondent's age, participation in school clubs, participation in non-
club, non-sport school activities, and time spent in-person with friends.  Looking at the y*-
standardized coefficients, female respondents' participation is .301 standard deviations higher 
than males, when all other variables are held constant.   For each year of age, reinforcing 
behavior increases by .175 standard deviations, when all other variables are held constant.  
Participation in school clubs increases reinforcing behaviors by .167 standard deviations when 
all other variables are held constant.  Participation in non-club, non-sport school activities (e.g. 
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band, student government) decreases reinforcing behaviors by .190 standard deviations when all 
variables are held constant.  Finally, for each unit increase in time spent with friends in person 
outside of school, reinforcing behavior increases by .184 standard deviations.   
 The Brant chi-square for this model is 12.48, meaning that the proportional odds 
assumption is met and the model represents what it purports to.  The McFadden's R-squared is 
.075, suggesting that this model explains about seven percent of the sample variation in 
reinforcing behavior.   
 Overall, these models are significant, but do not explain a great deal of the variance in the 
population.  What they do suggest about adolescents' online activities and the influences of 
offline networks is fascinating, nonetheless. 
Discussion 
Exploratory Behavior 
Parental Demographic Indicators 
 For this model, the parental demographic indicators were relatively minor.  Household 
income has a negative influence on respondents' exploratory behavior.  I am not sure exactly 
what would cause this relationship, although my initial hypothesis is that respondents whose 
households have more money might have different levels of access to creative expression for 
their children, i.e., children from higher SES backgrounds may participate in art classes or other 
means by which they can self-express without going online.  Alternately, higher-SES households 
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may have more barriers in place to online exploratory behavior (software filters, restrictions, 
etc.).  Further research is needed in this area.31 
Respondent Demographic Indicators 
 None of the respondents' demographic indicators were significant to exploratory 
behaviors.  This is actually interesting by its absence, as it suggests that regardless of age and 
gender, adolescents engage roughly equally in exploratory behavior.  This is essentially what I 
was expecting to see. 
Offline Network Strength  
 I initally thought that lower levels of offline network strength would correlate with higher 
levels of exploratory behavior, as the respondents would go online and create unique material to 
seek out new friends with shared interests.  However, only two of the offline indicators were 
significant; participation in school clubs and time spent in person with friends.  Participation in 
school clubs increases a respondent's exploratory behavior by .194 standard deviations when all 
other variables are held constant.  Much of the behavior included in the exploratory activity 
count is likely to be engaged in by club members – the creation of a website for other people, for 
instance.  Certain clubs, particularly those connected to the arts or culture, might attract 
respondents who are already creative and as such prone to engaging in exploratory behaviors.  
Furthermore, the original variable is a simple yes/no participation dichotomy; examining the 
frequency or depth of club participation might help explain this outcome further. 
                                                 
31Defining “high” and “low” SES when discussing households that own at least one computer seems a bit arbitrary.  
For this purpose, I would suggest that households with a median income over $50,000 would constitute “higher-
SES”, as the PIAL set uses $10,000 increments until $50,000, then goes to $25,000 increments. 
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 More interestingly, the more time a respondent reports spending in person with friends, 
the higher their predicted exploratory behavior count.  It is possible that some friendship 
networks could use time spent in person to engage in exploratory activities; collaborating on 
websites or other materials to be displayed online.  Alternately, respondents who spend lots of 
time with their friends may just use exploratory methods to expand their friendship networks.  
On the other hand, time spent in person with friends has a stronger effect on respondents' 
reinforcing behaviors (each unit of time spent in person with friends increases exploratory 
behavior by .274 standard deviations, but increases reinforcing behavior by .370 standard 
deviations).  As such, I would hesitantly accept hypothesis 1b.  Low levels of offline network 
strength do not necessarily result in higher levels of exploratory behavior than reinforcing 
behavior, but reinforcing behavior is more strongly affected by offline network strength. 
Reinforcement Model 
Parental Demographic Indicators 
 Similar to the exploratory model, parental demographics seem to play no role in 
respondents' reinforcing behavior.  This is somewhat surprising, as I had initially assumed rural 
residents might be more likely to use reinforcing methods to keep in touch with distant peers 
(and conversely, that urban residents would not use reinforcing methods, as their peer networks 
were more densely packed).  The big surprise here is that, regardless of parental residence, race, 
or income, adolescents use reinforcing behaviors roughly equally. 
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Respondent Demographic Indicators 
 Respondents' sex and age were both significant in the reinforcing behavior model.  When 
it comes to gender, females are much more likely to use reinforcing methods, an increase of .301 
standard deviations relative to male users when all other variables are held constant.  This 
finding strongly supports the existing literature; females use the internet primarily to speak with 
Friends and recreate/represent existing social networks, i.e., for reinforcement purposes (Lenhart 
& Madden 2007). 
 Age is also very important; as respondents grow older, their use of reinforcing methods 
increases fairly dramatically – with all other variables held constant, the difference in predicted 
outcome between a 12 year old and a 17 year old is (.1745*5= .8725) almost a full standard 
deviation.  This increase can be theoretically linked to teens' increasing access to the internet as 
they age; both due to their own demands for relative independence and presumably increased 
parental trust (Youn 2005, Livingstone & Helsper 2008).  There is a serious implication here for 
internet safety advocates, then: safety education needs to begin as early as possible, because the 
use of reinforcing behaviors like social network sites, instant messenger software, and many of 
the other vectors by which teens encounter online risks increase dramatically with age.   
Offline Network Strength 
 Three of the network strength indicators are significant in the reinforcing model.  
Participation in school clubs and time spent in person with friends both increase reinforcing 
activity, whereas participation in non-club, non-athletic school activities actually decreases 
reinforcing activity.  The relationship between time spent in person and reinforcing behavior is 
logical; online activity is simply another vector for connecting between friends.  Friends who 
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spend a lot of time together offline would likely spend a lot of time together online as well.  
School club participation also influences reinforcing behavior; perhaps the online 
communication allows members of clubs to communicate with one another outside of school – or 
possibly vice versa; members of school clubs use the internet to organize and communicate.  The 
relationship between non-club activities such as band and online communication is more 
interesting.  In practice, this could reflect several possibilities.  First, teenagers who engage in 
such activities are busier than their peers (practice, etc.) and as such less likely to spend time 
using the Internet at all.  Alternately, these activities might represent a different sort of 
“popularity” relative to club participation; respondents in clubs may represent one clique who are 
actively engaged with reinforcing methods, while participants who are active in non-school 
activities are part of different cliques or networks that do not value reinforcing methods as 
strongly (“preps” versus “band geeks” or what-have-you). 
Hypotheses 
 Comparing the results between the two models provides some interesting results.  
Hypothesis 1a suggested that respondents who have higher levels of offline network strength are 
more likely to engage in reinforcing activity, while hypothesis 1b claimed respondents with 
lower levels of offline network strength will be more likely to use exploratory methods.  The 
most obvious signifier in my results is the difference in r2 for reinforcing activity relative to 
exploratory activity (.075 or 7.5% of variance explained for reinforcing activity versus .025 or 
2.5% of variance explained for exploratory activity).  This would initially seem to support both 
hypotheses, as respondents with higher levels of offline network strength are more likely to 
participate in reinforcing methods.  On the other hand, participation in clubs and frequency of in-
80 
person communication increased reinforcing and exploratory methods of Internet 
communication, and at almost identical levels (with all other variables held constant, school club 
participation increased exploratory activity by .194 standard deviations and reinforcing activity 
by .167 standard deviations, for example), which suggests at best a tenuous connection between 
low offline network strength and higher exploratory activity; indeed, club participation actually 
has a stronger effect on exploratory behaviors than on reinforcing behaviors.  By plugging equal 
and arbitrary data into either model, I can compare the influence of offline network strength on a 
fictitious respondent.  My imaginary subject is a 15 year old female who is active in school clubs 
but not non-school activities, lives in a rural area, and spends time in-person with friends outside 
of school every day (a score of 4 in the coding).  Her family's household income was between 
$40,000 and $50,000 (a score of 5 in the coding).  This gives me the following sample models: 
 Exploratory = -.0593*5 + .1940 + .1456*4 = .4799 
 Reinforcing = .3009 + .1745*15 + .1665 + .1837*4 = 3.8197 
In these examples, the effects of age and gender actually determine much of the influence on 
reinforcing activities relative to exploratory activities, especially relative to the influence of time 
spent with friends outside of school.  As such, I need to find another way to measure the actual 
influence of offline network strength, such as comparing the standardized coefficients for the 
offline network strength indicators.  In the exploratory behavior model, school club participation 
and time spent in person with friends are both significant, with y*-standardized coefficients of 
.194 and .146, respectively.  In the reinforcement model, the y*-standardized coefficients for 
those indicators are .167 and .184.  This comparison is a bit of a mixed bag; while school club 
participation is more influential to exploratory behavior, time spent in person with friends is 
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more influential to reinforcing behavior.  Given that club participation is a simple yes/no 
variable, while time spent in person has four levels, it would seem that time spent in person with 
friends has a stronger effect overall, and with reinforcement having a (slightly) higher 
coefficient, reinforcing behavior may be more influenced by offline network strength than 
exploratory behavior.   
 This somewhat confirms hypothesis 1a (respondents who are highly connected to off-line 
social networks will have a greater likelihood of using reinforcing communications methods), at 
least insofar as time spent with friends is more influential on reinforcing behavior than 
exploratory.  On the other hand, the difference between the exploratory and reinforcing models is 
so small as to be almost negligible, and most of the actual difference between the two is largely 
driven by the influence of age and gender on reinforcing behavior.  As such, I would suggest that 
the result for hypothesis 1a is tentatively confirmed, while hypothesis 1b (respondents who are 
weakly connected to off-line social networks will have a greater likelihood of using exploratory 
methods) is inconclusive at best. 
 There are some interesting implications for parents and safety advocates here – first and 
foremost, it does not seem that a teen's level of off-line social engagement plays a significant 
effect on their online activities, especially as compared to age and, in the case of reinforcing 
behaviors, gender.  As such, any sort of online safety program needs to start as early as possible, 
while potentially offering different focuses on boys and girls' online risks. 
 In the next chapter, I will investigate the effects of risk perception, parental mediation, 
and self-mediation on the sharing of vulnerable personal information via SNS profile. 
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CHAPTER 5 – Identity Vulnerability 
 In the previous chapter, I began my investigation by studying the effects of offline 
network strength on adolescents' online communication methods.  In this chapter, I will focus 
specifically on adolescent usage of social network sites (SNS) and their sharing of vulnerable 
identity data, those materials that an unwanted individual could theoretically use to identify or 
track the owner of a given SNS profile.   
Method 
Participants 
 From Chapter 4's data set of 735 teens, I cut the sample down further to the 430 teens 
who reported creating a profile on a social network site like Myspace or Facebook, due to PIAL 
only asking identity vulnerability questions of respondents who had SNS profiles.  Respondents 
were between the ages of 12-17 (M = 15.17, SD = 1.495).  45.8% were male and 54.2% female.  
The teens were not directly asked about their racial or ethnic identity, however, 86.5% of 
respondents' parents identified as white and non-Hispanic, 5.8% identified as Black and non-
Hispanic, 4.7% identified as Hispanic, and 3.0% identified as some other racial group.  By 
region, 20.0% lived in the Northeastern U.S., 26.0% in the Midwest, 31.9% in the South, and 
22.1% in the West.  55.1% of respondents lived in suburban areas, while 21.6% were rural and 
23.3% were urban. 
Dependent Variable 
 Identity Vulnerability: In the initial factor analysis, nine variables were chosen to 
represent various potentially compromising pieces of information that could be shared on a 
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respondent's profile; photos of self, photos of Friends, first and last name, school name, 
hometown, instant messaging user name, email address, and a blog link.  These variables loaded 
onto three core factors; one consisting of respondents' last name, school name, and hometown 
(physical identity data), photos of self and Friends (visual identity data), and IM name/email 
address (digital identity data).   In this case, theoretically the physical identity data is the most 
problematic, as it can be used for the most nefarious purposes (e.g. by a predator to locate 
potential victims or by bullies to confirm the online presence of an offline target).  As such, I 
decided to use a combined scale of the physical identifier variables, giving us a range from 0 (no 
physical identifiers posted) to 3 (all physical identifiers posted).  I also tested the visual and 
digital identity data simply for the sake of thoroughness. Details of this scheme are presented in 
Table 10. 
Independent Variables 
 Risk Perception: For this concept, I chose two questions concerning whether strangers 
and bullies were more likely to use the internet or the real world to approach people.  As a 
“scale” consisting of two variables is relatively pointless, I simply used each indicator 
individually in my regression. 
 Self-Mediation: I chose three variables to represent degrees of self mediation; whether or 
not a profile was visible to all users, whether or not the respondent was Friends with any total 
strangers (i.e., individuals they had no online or offline connections to), and the level of reported 
honesty in a respondent's profile.  The first two variables were coded bivariate (i.e., a profile was 
visible to everybody or was not visible to everybody, and a respondent was Friends with a total 
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stranger or was not Friends with a total stranger), while the third was scaled with levels running 
from “Profile is completely honest” to “Profile is completely false”. 
 Parental Mediation: The nine variables related to parental mediation in my model fall 
into two groups; one related to parents' responses about rule-setting behavior, and the other 
related to responses about external forms of mediation (monitoring/filtering software, parents 
actively checking what respondents do online).  It appears there are two different interpretations 
of parental mediation; rule-setting behavior by parents and then hands-on mediation techniques.  
I decided to investigate both separately, creating two distinct stages in my model, one using three 
indicators regarding parents' statements about rule-setting (i.e. whether or not the parents said 
there were rules about what sites their children could visit) and the other using children's 
awareness of parental mediation techniques (i.e., does the child believe the computer they use at 
home has monitoring or filtering software).  I chose the variables measuring children's 
perception of mediation rather than the ones using the parents' statements as, theoretically, it is 
more important for the child to believe that their behavior is being monitored or moderated 
(whether it actually is or not) than it is for the parents to have mediation systems in play without 
the child's awareness; after all, the child will only alter their behavior if they are actively aware 
of any mediation practices – they cannot react to what they do not know exists. 
 Demographic Variables: As with the models in the previous chapter, I used a mix of 
demographic variables as well; gender and age were chosen for theoretical interest.  Parental race 
was used as an admittedly questionable stand-in for respondent's race/ethnicity, and respondent's 
community type (urban/suburban/rural) and census region were included as well.  In all cases 
except age, the variables were recoded as dummy variables.  The reference categories for each 
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variable were “male” for sex, “white” for parental race, “South” for Census region, and 
“suburban” for community type.  Details of all exogenous varaibles are presented in Table 11. 
Analytical Technique 
 To examine the effects of risk perception, parental mediation and self-mediation on 
identity vulnerability, I estimated three ordered logistic regression models.  The first model 
regresses physical identity vulnerability indicators on the variables discussed above, including 
demographic indicators for the child and one parent. The second model regresses visual identity 
vulnerability indicators on the same variables. Finally, the third model regresses digital identity 
vulnerability indicators on the same independent variables.  Results of these analyses are found 
in Table 13. 
Results 
Physical Identity Vulnerability Model 
 In the first model, six variables exhibit significant effects on respondents' levels of 
physical identity vulnerability: having a parent who identifies as black, gender, age, child 
reporting that their parents check to see where they have been online, child reporting that their 
parents use filtering software, and level of respondent's profile honesty.  Looking first at the 
control variables, having a parent who identifies as black increases a respondent's level of 
physical vulnerability by .430 standard deviations when all other variables are held constant.  
Female respondents have a .457 standard deviations higher level of physical vulnerability than 
males, while each year increase in a respondent's age increases the level of physical vulnerability 
by .091 standard deviations.  Looking at parental mediation methods, children who report that 
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their parents check to see where they have been online have a .267 standard deviations lower 
level of physical vulnerability than their peers, while children who report that their parents use 
filtering software see a decrease in physical vulnerability of .197 standard deviations.  Finally, 
each increasing level of falsehood in a respondent's profile decreases their physical vulnerability 
by .144 standard deviations.   
 The McFadden's r-squared for this model is .075, meaning that this model explains 7.5% 
of the variance in the sample, and the Brant chi-squared is 53.08, meaning that the model 
accurately depicts the relationship between variables.   
Visual Identity Vulnerability Model 
 In the second model, four variables exhibit significant effects on respondents' levels of 
visual identity vulnerability: household income, sex, age, and parents reporting rules about the 
types of sites children can visit.  Each level increase in household income raises a respondent's 
level of visual vulnerability by .082 standard deviations, when all other variables are held 
constant.  Females have a .318 standard deviations higher level of visual vulnerability, while 
each year of age increases visual vulnerability by .138 standard deviations.  Finally, parents who 
report having rules about the types of sites their children can visit decrease the respondent's 
visual vulnerability by .542 standard deviations. 
 The Mcfadden's r-squared for this model is .083, suggesting that it explains 8.3% of the 
variation in visual vulnerability in the sample.  The Brant chi-square is 10.64, so I can accept this 
model as accurate. 
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Digital Identity Vulnerability Model 
 The third model has only two variables that display significant effects on digital identity 
vulnerability: living in an urban community and whether or not a respondent was Friends with a 
stranger.  Urban respondents have a .276 standard deviations lower level of digital vulnerability 
than suburban dwellers, while being Friends with a stranger increases the level of digital 
vulnerability by .282 standard deviations when all other variables are held constant.  The 
McFadden's r-squared for the model is .027, meaning that the model explains 2.7% of the 
variance in the sample.  The Brant chi-squared is 21.79, meaning the model is acceptably 
accurate. 
Discussion 
General Observations 
 It would appear that respondents' perception of the Internet as a potentially risky 
environment has absolutely no influence on their sharing of personally identifying material.  This 
actually seems to conflict somewhat with earlier research, which found that the more 
comfortable a teenager reportedly felt with the Internet, the more likely they were to engage in 
risky behavior (Youn 2005, Livingstone and Helper 2008).  I see two potential explanations here.  
The more likely of the two is data-related - the questions in the PIAL data set simply do not 
measure risk perception as accurately I would have hoped.  Simply asking teenagers if they are 
more worried about stalkers and bullies online does not really measure whether or not they 
consider the internet as a whole to be unsafe.  Alternately, SNS users as an aggregate are more 
comfortable online (or at least believe they are more capable) and as such are less worried about 
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online risk.  In either case, this seems to be an area where further research is definitely called for.  
Also, across all three IV models, Census region had absolutely no effect.  This is interesting by 
its absence, as it suggests that across the United States, teenagers share personal information in 
roughly similar ways.   
Physical Identity Vulnerability  
 Looking at the physical identity vulnerability results, it is interesting to see that having a 
Black parent has an effect on PIV relative to having a white parent, but not having a Hispanic or 
other non-white parent.  I am not sure exactly what could be causing this effect.  It is not due to 
mediation techniques, as those are already tested for.  However, only 5.3% of responding parents 
identified as Black, relative to about 13% of the total U.S. population.   
 When it comes to respondents' own demographic data, PIV is influenced by both sex and 
age.  Girls are considerably less likely to post PIV than boys.  This seems reasonable, given that 
much of the media coverage about online risks focus on girls as the primary victims.  On the 
other hand, given that girls are supposedly more likely to use SNS to bolster offline friendship 
netowrks, it seems odd that girls are less likely to post PIV than boys.  However, if the friendship 
networks are pre-existing, perhaps posting too much information is not necessary – if a teenager 
already knows how to find her offline friends online, why would she need to post more 
information than is absolutely necessary?  Indeed, data falsification could be an intentional part 
of the process, using specific alterations as a code.  This ties in well with the significance of 
profile falsification as it relates to the sharing of PIV – a fake hometown, last name, or school 
might act as a sort of shibboleth – Sarah Jones from Anytown Middle School is being careful and 
dubs herself “Sarah Sparkles” from “Lazytown Middle School.”  While previous research 
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suggests that boys are more likely to falsify information than girls, it seems the falsification may 
not be in the areas immediately pertinent to PIV (Lenhart & Madden 2007).  This logically ties in 
with boys' reported use of SNS to meet and flirt with girls; physical location would be highly 
useful in such a scenario – users might be more willing to engage with flirtatious chat with a 
Friend on the other side of the country, under the assumption that the long distance involved 
diminishes any chance of offline awkwardness.  Alternately, users might explicitly look for 
Friends in their immediate area with hopes of meeting in person.   
 Age also proves to be a siginficant indicator of a respondent's likelihood of engaging in 
PIV sharing.  For each year's increase in age, PIV increases by .0912 standard deviations.  Given 
that the range of ages runs from 12 to 17, age has the potential to be extremely significant.  This 
makes sense, as not only do parents give more responsibility to older children (both as pertains to 
the Internet and in general), but older children are probably more likely to be online in the first 
place.  Furthermore, while SNS usage is technically restricted to children over the age of 13 for 
Facebook and 14 for Myspace32, it is well documented that younger children lie about their age 
in order to bypass SNS blocks (Thewall 2008; Lenhart & Madden 2007).  Older teens may also 
be more competent in their ability to bypass various restrictions imposed on their online 
behavior. 
 It is extremely interesting to see that parental rule-setting behavior has absolutely no 
effect whatsoever on PIV sharing.  It is significant that the questions about rule-setting were only 
asked of parents and not of the teenaged respondents.  As such, while the parents may feel there 
are clear rules in place about online activities, the respondents themselves may not be as aware 
of those rules as parents might think.  It is also possible that children might be aware of the rules, 
                                                 
32When the data set was collected, the age minimum for both sites was 16. 
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but simply ignore them.  In either case, it appears that attempts to control PIV behavior via 
simple rule-setting is completely and totally ineffectual.  Similarly, monitoring software proved 
equally insignificant as a means of PIV prevention.  The use of filters to actively restrict usage, 
as well as parents checking a child's online activity (and perhaps more importantly, telling a child 
they check the online activity) both proved significant, however.  This is unusual, as it seems that 
more technologically-savvy teens could find workarounds (deleting a browser history, using SNS 
from an unrestricted location, etc.) to circumvent these mediation tactics.  On the other hand, it is 
possible that parents who use such active mediation techniques are simply more involved in all 
aspects of their children's lives, and this heightened involvement is the significant factor, rather 
than the software or the checking.   
 Finally, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the amount of false material a respondent posts to 
their profile decreases their level of PIV.  This seems obvious on first glance, but upon further 
consideration there are some interesting implications.  PIV factors might not necessarily be the 
ones a user would falsify on an SNS profile, as they are amongst the most critical (other than a 
photograph) in allowing offline friends to find an online profile.  That is not to say there is no 
reason to falsify such information, as discussed above.  While profile falsification may not be 
done for security purposes, it seems that respondents who falsify some data are more likely to 
falsify critical PIV data as well. 
 Intriguingly, the other self-mediation indicators in the PIV model were not significant – 
suggesting that a respondent's level of PIV is unconnected to Friendship with strangers or the 
overall visibility of their profile.  A teen whose profile is visible to the entire Internet is just as 
likely to share PIV data as a teen who secures everything behind a “Friends only” shield, and a 
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teen who Friends total strangers is just as risk-prone as a teen who carefully monitors her Friend 
network.   
 It is also worth pointing out that this model only explains 7.5% of the total variance in 
PIV behavior in the population.  While that is certainly worthy of attention, it still means that 
over 90% of PIV behavior is going unexplained. 
Visual Identity Vulnerability 
 When it comes to VIV, location indicators play no significant role – across the U.S., 
regardless of population density, teenagers have similar VIV sharing patterns.  As far as parental 
demographics go, race did not prove significant, but household income does play a role. I would 
surmise that the positive relationship between household income and VIV data is most likely due 
to children from higher-SES households having greater access to digital cameras and other 
devices that allow for VIV sharing.33  As with PIV, age and gender are both significant to 
respondents' PIV behaviors.  The most significant difference is that girls are more likely to post 
VIV data than boys.  One potential explanation is that girls may believe that their apperance is 
valued more than boys', and as such are more likely to share images of themselves for peer 
approval.  Alternately, as discussed earlier, girls use SNS to reinforce existing offline networks, 
and posting photographs of themselves with their offline friends would be a strong component of 
such behaviors.  As far as age is concerned, I imagine much the same factors are in play as with 
PIV – older teens are more likely to use SNS in the first place, they are more likely to believe 
                                                 
33Recall again this is 2006 data – even though 80% of respondents in this sample claimed to have a cell phone, it is 
unclear how many of those phones had camera capabilities compared to today, when a camera is practically 
standard equipment. 
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they are competent online, and they are more likely to have their parents' trust with the 
technology that generates VIV data (cameras, etc.).   
 Only one of the parental mediation indicators proved significant – respondents whose 
parents report setting rules about which sites can and cannot be visited have a lower VIV level 
than their peers.  This finding is somewhat peculiar – none of the active mediation methods were 
significant, and none of the other parental rules were significant.  Interestingly, none of the self-
mediation tactics were significant either.  I believe this speaks to the ubiquitousness of images on 
SNS profiles – if a respondent has a profile, they likely have a photograph attached to it.  It is 
simply part of the normative culture of SNS.  Perhaps this explains the rule-setting behavior's 
significance as well – if a child is forbidden from using the SNS sites (in which case they access 
it furtively), posting VIV data might be seen as too risky – not in the sense of predators, 
strangers, or other malefactors finding their profile, but simply to keep their parents (or their 
Friends' parents) at bay. 
Digital Identity Vulnerability 
 Living in an urban area has a significant effect on respondents' digital identity 
vulnerability.  Urban dwellers are less likely to post DIV data than their suburban counterparts.  I 
would suggest this may have something to do with population density – respondents in urban 
areas can more readily get in touch with their peers, and do not need to share connecting 
information online.  Suburban respondents may have friends who live a significant distance 
away.  On the other hand, if this was the case, I might expect rural dwellers to have a higher level 
of DIV data – so density may not be the only answer. 
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 None of the parental or respondent demographic data has any significance on DIV 
activity.  This in and of itself is interesting – it would seem that all teenagers with SNS profiles 
share this data in roughly the same ways.  Furthermore, none of the parental mediation methods 
are significant.  The only other indicator significant to DIV activity is a respondent's reporting a 
Friendship with a stranger.  Perhaps teens who are Friends with total strangers are using SNS in 
ways that other teens do not – to build broader social networks based on shared interests (i.e. for 
exploratory purposes).  By sharing this information, they are allowing their distant Friends to 
stay in contact outside of the SNS sphere.   
 Going back to Table 11, only about half of all SNS-using respondents engage in either of 
the two DIV-sharing activities.  Perhaps this is part of the issue; so few respondents even bother 
sharing a blog link (most likely because they do not have one34) that those who share DIV are 
largely a self-selecting crowd.  To share blog links or email addresses, the respondents have to 
care about sharing those things – both of which are significantly less relevant to the overall SNS 
experience than PIV or VIV data.   
Hypotheses 
 Returning now to my hypotheses, I feel the results for hypothesis 2 (Respondents who 
perceive the Internet with high levels of potental risk will have a higher level of self-mediation) 
are inconclusive.  Mostly, I feel this is due to the indicators available in the PIAL data set simply 
being insufficient to measure risk perception.  As such, I would recommend further targeted 
research in this area. 
                                                 
34Only 41.5% of the sample reported having an online journal or blog. 
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 I strongly accept hypothesis 3a (respondents who report a high level of self-mediation 
will have a low level of identity vulnerability).  Looking at both the PIV and DIV models, a 
respondent with higher levels of mediation (e.g., increased profile falsification or not being 
Friends with strangers) will have a decreasing level of identity vulnerability.  Looking at the PIV 
model, each level of increased profile falsification increases a respondent's overall PIV score by 
.1435 standard deviations when all other variables are held constant.  This is as significant as a 
year of age, and a fully false profile has as significant an effect on a respondent's PIV score as 
gender or parental race (-.1435*5= -.7175 versus -.4565 or .4303).  Simply put, self-mediation 
does have a direct effect on profile vulnerability. 
 Regarding hypothesis 3b (respondents who report a high level of parental mediation will 
have a low level of identity vulnerability), I would accept it with some qualifications – only 
respondents who report specific types of parental mediation have lower levels of physical 
identity vulnerability.  Parental rules and technological mediation do not seem to effect PIV, 
whereas more active forms of parental mediation (i.e., parents checking to see where their 
children have been online or outright blocking problematic sites) do decrease PIV.   
 Finally, hypothesis 3c (self-mediation will have a stronger effect on respondents' degree 
of identity vulnerability than parental mediation) can be accepted, again with qualifications.  The 
y-sub Beta score for level of profile falsification is -.144, meaning that for each level of 
falsification (out of five possible) a respondent's physical identity vulnerability score decreases 
by .144 standard deviations with all other variables held constant.  Conversely, a respondent's 
awareness that their parent checks where they have been online has a y-sub Beta of -.267, 
meaning that with all other variables held constant, parental checkups only decrease identity 
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vulnerability by .267 standard deviations.  The use of filtering software to block teenagers from 
using specific sites has a y-sub Beta of -.197, only decreasing PIV by .197 standard deviations.  
As such, it seems that two levels of profile falsification is equivalent in effect to a parental 
checkup, while one level of falsification is almost as effective as filtering software.  Therefore, I 
can accept hypothesis 3c with the aforementioned qualifications. 
 Overall, these results have some very important implications for parents, safety 
advocates, and others who are interested in teens' safety online.  First and foremost, age matters.  
Any intervention protocol that hopes for a real chance of success has to strike early, before kids 
get deeply involved in SNS activity.  Teens are going to use these sites, even if it requires lying 
about their age during the registration process (and falsifying one's age is as simple as picking 
the wrong year of birth while signing up for the site).  As such, parents and safety advocates need 
to warn teens early on about the potential risks involved.  Second, parents must take a more 
active role in their child's online activities.  Simply setting rules is not enough, and while filters 
and monitors might keep adolescents away from sexual or violent materials, they appear to have 
very little effect on risky SNS behavior.  Monitors, at least in the context of SNS, appear to be 
completely ineffectual, possibly because teens do not think they are doing anything wrong (and 
in the context of adolescent SNS protocol, they are not).  Filters are essentially either/or – a site 
is either blocked or it is not, which might simply encourage the child to access the forbidden site 
through some other means.  As noted above, the most effective parental mediation tactic was 
when respondents were actively aware that their parents check online activity after the fact.  
While it was only a minor effect relative to age and gender, it was still significant enough to 
make a difference.  Parents must take an active role in their child's experience, rather than 
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passively declaring rules and hoping technological controls will prevent risky behavior.  Any 
systematic attempt to prevent risky behavior on SNS then must involve the parents and the 
children. 
Complete Model 
 As a final attempt to evaluate my theoretical model, I ran the SNS-users' data through a 
complete model, combining the offline network strength indicators from Chapter 4 with the 
identity vulnerability indicators from earlier in this chapter.  Results of this analysis are found in 
Table Thirteen.  I specifically chose to only run the data through a model using physical identity 
vulnerability as the dependent variable, primarily because PIV is the greatest cause for social 
concern (as it is directly connected to stalking, bullying, stranger contact, and many other risks). 
 In this model, seven indicators display significant effects on respondents' sharing of PIV 
data.  Having a black parent, respondent's sex, respondent's age, frequency of talking to offline 
friends on a landline telephone, respondents' knowing their parents check their online activity, 
respondents knowing their parents use filtering software, and the degree of a respondent's profile 
honesty all are significant.  Having a black parent increases a respondent's degree of PIV by .412 
standard deviations when all other variables are held constant.  Females have a .389 standard 
deviations lower level of PIV than boys when all other variables are held constant.  For each year 
of respondent's age, PIV increases by .072 standard deviations when all other variables are held 
constant.  For every reported increase in time spent talking to friends on a landline telephone, 
PIV decreases by .122 standard deviations when all other variables are held constant.  
Respondents who know their parents check online activity have a PIV score .262 standard 
deviations lower than their peers when all other variables are held constant.  Respondents whose 
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parents use filtering software see a .214 standard deviation decrease in PIV level when all other 
variables are held constant.  Finally, for each increased level of profile honesty, respondents' PIV 
level decreases by .144 standard deviations when all other variables are held constant.  The 
McFadden's r-squared for the model is .096, meaning that this model explains almost 10% of the 
total variance in the sample.  The Brant chi-squared is 14.69, meaning I can accept the model as 
accurate. 
Discussion 
 There are some very interesting results here.  Most significantly, a respondent's levels of 
exploratory and reinforcing behavior have no effect on PIV when using SNS.  It would seem that 
regardless of how teens use the internet, they are equally likely to share personal information on 
their profiles.  Of course, this particular data set is specifically limited to those respondents who 
have created an SNS profile, and only measures PIV on those profiles.  It does not, and cannot, 
say anything about PIV sharing via other vectors such as chat rooms or message boards.   
 Of the offline network strength measurements, as respondents' reported frequency spent 
speaking with friends via landline telephone increases, the level of PIV sharing decreases.  This 
is somewhat surprising, as it would seem that those teens who spend much of their time on the 
phone would also use SNS to connect with friends, and would share PIV information as a means 
of furthering that connection.  Perhaps some teens prefer the telephone to SNS, and simply spend 
less time on SNS overall, relative to their peers.  Alternately, frequent telephone communication 
simply reflects a different type of social connectedness – the phone calls are with a romantic 
interest, while SNS is used to connect with friends (or vice versa).  Possibly, respondents who 
frequently use landline telephones to communicate with friends are still using dial-up internet 
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(remember, this is data from 2006) and can only either speak or be online at a given time.  
Regardless, this is an interesting finding, and warrants further investigation.  Also significant is 
the fact that none of the “participation” indicators had any effect on PIV sharing.  Regardless of 
participation or non-participation in sports, clubs, or other activities, respondents share 
information in roughly the same ways and at the same levels. 
 Two of the parental mediation methods have a significant effect on PIV sharing.  
Respondents who know their parents check their online activity and respondents whose parents 
use filtering software on the home computer both see a decrease in PIV sharing.  As was the case 
in earlier models, parental rule-setting has absolutely no effect.  This would suggest that parental 
rule-setting is only viable as part of a holistic safety system; checking where teens go, actively 
filtering out dangerous content, and remaining engaged with what teens are actually doing 
online. 
 Of the self-mediation tactics, only profile falsification affects a respondent's level of PIV 
sharing, which again, seems obvious.  By putting false information, a respondent is logically 
excluding honest information.  It also suggests that the profile information that is most frequently 
falsified falls under the aegis of PIV information – first name, last name, hometown, school, etc.  
The reasons for falsifying this information are varied.  As discussed earlier, false information 
might serve as a gatekeeper for safety-conscious users (a false last name or hometown could 
winnow out users who aren't “true” Friends) or it might simply be for comic effect.  Either way, 
this result is largely unsurprising.  What is surprising is that Friendship with strangers and visible 
profiles do not have an effect on PIV sharing.  This is definitely cause for some concern; a 
visible profile is just that.  While a visible profile might aid offline friends in creating online 
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connections, it also opens up the user to all the risks discussed earlier; phishing, stalking and 
harassment, stranger contact and so forth.  All of these rely on exactly the sort of PIV data being 
shared.  Stranger Friendship is perhaps a slightly smaller concern, as some of the Friending 
behavior teens engage in online certainly counts as “being Friends with a person you do not 
personally know” but is actually relatively innocuous, such as following a musician, athlete, or 
other celebrity.  Furthermore, most cyber-bullying appears to be perpetrated by individuals the 
victim knows offline, which means stranger Friendship is likely a limited risk in that case.  On 
the other hand, malefactors using phishing techniques may use a false account to Friend a 
potential victim.  Similarly, much has been made of cases where bullies, etc., have used fake 
profiles to trap their victims, and PIV sharing simply makes it easier for these would-be bullies 
to connect with their targets. 
 Once again, risk perception seems to have no effect on PIV sharing.  As discussed earlier, 
I believe this is largely due to the variables I chose poorly reflecting the reality of teens' 
understanding of internet risk.  Residential demographics (Census region and community type) 
also have no effect.  This is again consistent with the previous models, and reinforces the idea 
that across the United States, in big cities and small towns, North, South, East, or West, teens are 
equally likely to share PIV data.  The same holds true for household income.   
 The only parental demographic that mattered was having a black parent.  Again, I am not 
sure exactly how to interpret this result.  It is not due to household income or use of mediation 
tactics, as both of those are already controlled for.  Perhaps black parents are less aware of SNS, 
or less concerned about the risks involved.  It is possible that there may be other mediation 
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techniques in play that the data set does not cover.  This is an area that definitely needs further, 
targeted, research. 
 Respondents' sex and age both were very important to the level of PIV sharing.  As 
discussed earlier, it is interesting that girls share less information than boys do, but there are a 
host of potential explanations.  The activities that girls engage in may not necessarily require 
much PIV sharing, especially if some profile information is falsified.  Conversely, boys may 
share more information as part of their desire to use SNS to flirt and meet girls.  The significance 
of age is also logical.  Older children are more likely to be allowed online in the first place, and 
may share more information on their profile to seem “mature.”  It may also be the case that 
having a SNS profile (and sharing PIV data) is part of the normative culture of teenagers, and 
past a certain age, those who do not share this information are seen as pariahs or weirdoes.   
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions 
 This study began with a simple question: what would possess someone to post 
photographs to the internet which could get them suspended, expelled, or even arrested?  It is 
quite possibly the oldest social research question: “what is wrong with kids these days?”  I had 
an initial idea that teens share every minute detail of their personal lives with total strangers 
because they live in a world where shows like Big Brother and The Real World turn the mundane 
doings of “ordinary” people into celebrity culture.  Teens see that, and they want to be the stars 
of their own “reality show”, both figuratively and literally.35  There has to be more to it than that, 
though – blaming it all on celebrity culture is too easy an explanation.   
 The problem of risky behavior by teenagers on the internet comes back again and again 
to the issue of information sharing.  The posting of problematic material like profanity or 
suggestive photographs can cause immediate friction with parents and other authority figures and 
could potentially lead to long-term problems for teens as they continue into adulthood in a world 
where colleges and employers routinely run background checks.  Sexual solicitation and cyber-
bullying require at least an initial sharing of information; for an offline bully to locate someone 
online, the target must share enough pertinent information to allow the bully to track them down.  
Even in a case where an online miscreant is seeking a random victim, there has to be an initial 
release of information suitable to draw the malefactor’s attention.  The kinds of data commonly 
shared on social network sites (first and last name, hometown, school, photographs) are ideal for 
online confirmation of offline identities, as well as for gaining unauthorized access to email hosts 
and other web services which use that sort of data as a security check. 
                                                 
35 Consider “Tila Tequila,” the model who turned her Myspace popularity into a reality show, a book deal, and a 
recording contract. 
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 The existing literature on adolescent usage of social network sites suggested several 
potential answers to the problem of risky information sharing.  The dramaturgical models argue 
that teens use SNS as a vector for identity performance; adolescents create profiles as a way of 
maintaining their image to their peer network.  A MySpace or Facebook profile is an idealized 
self, the version of reality that teenagers want their friends (and Friends) to believe.  Photos, 
links, and comments are all tactically deployed to display a specific aspect of the creator’s 
personality, whether serious, silly, or downright strange.  The specific choices may vary, but 
overall the SNS is seen as a “backspace” area where teenagers can engage with their peers in 
relative privacy, free from the overprotective adult world.  Authority figures and other 
unwelcome individuals are seen as outsiders and SNS profiles as a performance they were not 
invited to witness.  It does not matter if the interlopers are bullies seeking a target, parents 
seeking the truth about what their children are up to, or sexual deviants seeking victims, the 
contents of the SNS profile were never meant for outside consumption.  From this perspective, 
the risk to teenagers is not in the sharing per se, but in unwanted audiences gaining access to 
these private displays, whether through accidental interception or through intentional intrusion. 
The postmodern perspective claims that SNS are a panoptic observation device, a 24-
hour social control mechanism that teens willingly submit to.  The reflexive design of SNS 
means that users are constantly on display for their Friends.  The Friend network polices user 
behavior; appropriate performances receive “likes” and positive comments, inappropriate 
performances are penalized with negative comments or the dreaded “unfriending.”  While users 
have the potential for play and transgression in their SNS profiles, the vast majority remain 
constrained by the norms of the Friend network.  From this perspective, risky behavior is largely 
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part of the normative performance, as in the dramaturgical model.  Teens who engage in risky 
information sharing are just doing what is expected by their peer network; what one shares, all 
the rest have to confirm and share in kind.  Again, the risk is less in the actual sharing of 
information, and more in who has access to the shared information. 
The developmental psychology model suggests that for teenagers, SNS are one way to 
experiment with who they are, or more accurately, who they are going to become.  Online 
communication allows these teens to develop their adult selves.  The ways teenagers use the 
internet reflect their feelings of belonging and social connectedness as well.  Teens may use the 
internet to engage with their offline friends and strengthen those existing social connections, or 
they may seek out new friends online, based on shared interests or a common sense of 
outsiderness.  Here, risky sharing is part of the experimentation process, teens share potentially 
compromising materials as part of the exploring process – telling strangers who they are is part 
of telling the world (and by extension, telling themselves) who they are.  The real risk is in 
sharing the wrong information with the wrong individuals. 
My theoretical model offers a synthesis of these three disparate approaches.  
Dramaturgical impression management is the psychologists’ self-identity construction.  The 
postmodernist panopticon is the dramaturgist’s front-space performance area.  The three 
naturally and logically blend into a single flowing narrative.  Teenagers’ offline social 
connectedness will influence their choice of online communication methods, with better 
connected teens favoring instant messaging and SNS to reinforce their offline networks, and less 
connected teens preferring chat rooms, blogs, and other creative forms to express themselves and 
seek out kindred spirits.  The types of risk teenagers face, as well as the mediation practices they 
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use to mitigate that risk, are largely based on the normative culture of different internet 
communications methods.  SNS expect users to share names, photographs, and personal 
information, whereas chat rooms and message boards offer a greater degree of anonymity.  
Between these community expectations of privacy and the influence of parental restrictions of 
online activity, teenagers decide which information to share with the internet and which 
information to keep private.  The risk is in choosing the wrong information to share, and in 
allowing otherwise harmless information to fall into the wrong hands. 
 My research model was designed to test the relationships in my theoretical model by 
applying it to a set of nationally representative data.  Respondents with higher levels of offline 
connectedness would be more likely to use instant messaging and SNS, which are tailor-made for 
reinforcing offline relationships, while respondents with lower levels of connectedness would be 
more likely to use chat rooms, blogs, and other creative forms of communication which allow 
users to seek out online relationships with other users who share their interests. 
The Pew Internet and American Life Project data set I utilized for this research only 
measures respondents’ information sharing over SNS, which limited my results somewhat.  
Within this framework, respondents’ self mediation when using SNS would be limited by default 
to controlling who has access to a profile and the falsification of profile data.  Higher levels of 
self-mediation would lead to lower levels of risky information-sharing on the actual profile.  
Parental attempts at mediation and respondents’ own perceptions of the internet as a risky venue 
would also serve to lower the sharing of personal data.  
 After performing an ordered logistic regression on the data, the results were not precisely 
what I anticipated finding.  As far as the relationship between offline network strength and online 
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communications activity, the most striking result is that respondents, regardless of their offline 
connections, use the internet in similar ways.  This conflicts somewhat with my model, as I 
suggested that less-connected teens would do more exploration and less reinforcing, while the 
more connected teens would do less exploring and more reinforcing.  While teens that have more 
offline social connections clearly use the internet to communicate with friends more frequently, 
they also use the internet to explore their personalities and express themselves online; 
respondents who were members of school clubs and who reported higher levels of time spent in 
person with friends had increased likelihoods of using both reinforcing and exploratory 
communication methods.  There was not, as I anticipated, a negative relationship between offline 
social connections and online exploratory activity.  While exploratory communication is not as 
strongly influenced by offline network strength as reinforcing communication, there is still a 
positive relationship between the two.  Indeed, it seems the more connected teens are offline, the 
more teens communicate online, period.  This is a significant finding in and of itself.    
Some of the biggest impacts on online activity were not related to network strength, but 
user demographics.  Indeed, in some cases the demographic variables were actually a stronger 
predictor of online activities than the network strength variables.  Older teens and females were 
more likely to use reinforcing methods, which tracks well with the existing literature; older teens 
are given more freedom to use the internet, and females specifically report using the internet to 
communicate with their offline friends (Lenhart & Madden 2007).  Increased levels of household 
income result in higher levels of exploratory usage, presumably as these respondents have more 
access or more encouragement to engage in creative endeavors offline as well as online. 
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 Looking at the effects of risk perception and mediation tactics on identity sharing 
behavior, risk perception appeared to have no real effect on respondents’ information sharing, 
although I believe this is more due to limitations in the data set.  Respondents’ risk management 
strategies had only a limited effect on sharing personal information, with profile falsification 
being more effective than controlling profile access.  This follows my theoretical model after a 
fashion; the nature of the communication method (in this case, SNS) directly influenced the 
means by which respondents mediate their own experience, with data falsification easier to 
engage in as opposed to navigating the sometimes complex privacy settings of the major SNS.  
Respondents whose parents used filtering software to block prohibited websites had lower levels 
of risky information sharing, as well as those respondents whose parents actively checked their 
online activities.  This is also in keeping with my theoretical model.  It also has some major 
implications for parents and safety advocates, as discussed below. 
 Finally, the overall relationship between network strength, online communications 
methods, risk perception, parental and individual mediation techniques on personal information 
posting behaviors is relatively inconclusive.  Demographic factors like parental race, 
respondent’s age, and respondent’s sex have as strong a, and in some cases stronger, effect on 
information sharing than any of the indicators I chose to test for.  While this is not what I 
expected, it is certainly significant.  Teenagers with a black parent, boys, and older teens are all 
at a higher risk for sharing personally identifying information online.  The amount of time a 
respondent spends on a landline telephone speaking with friends actually decreases information 
sharing.  This was the only one of the network strength indicators to test significant against 
information sharing, and the negative nature of the relationship bears further investigation.  
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Interestingly, a respondent’s level of exploratory or reinforcing behavior has no significant effect 
on information sharing behavior.  Again, not something I expected, but definitely worth 
investigating further – it would seem risky information sharing via SNS is the same for teens, 
regardless of their engagement with other communication methods.  Parental mediation has a 
significant effect, specifically in cases where parents check teens’ online activity or use filtering 
software to limit access to unacceptable sites.  I would suggest this is due more to parents’ active 
engagement with their children than the actual filters; if a parent filtered an SNS site entirely, a 
child would have to create and maintain their profile from some other location (or circumvent the 
filter).  Within the options available to respondents to mediate their own experience, respondents 
who report higher levels of profile falsification have lower levels of risky information sharing.  
This is perfectly reasonable; if the risky information is fake, it is not truly being shared, is it? 
Overall, the final analysis fits my theoretical model reasonably well; offline network 
strength clearly has an effect on what teens do online.  When it comes to SNS, the options 
available to users have an effect on how they mediate their online risks, and parental mediation 
methods further influence teens' risk mediation strategies.   
Limitations 
While my findings are certainly interesting, I have some personal concerns about the 
effectiveness of my study.  Secondary data analysis is never perfect, and this project was no 
exception.  First and foremost, the data set I am using is five years old, and rapid changes in 
online communication opportunities for teenagers might mean that my research is in some ways 
already outdated.  Indeed, since I started the project Facebook and MySpace both dramatically 
revamped their security settings (several times, in Facebook's case).  When this sample was 
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gathered, YouTube was barely a year old, and Twitter, now seemingly ubiquitous, did not even 
exist.36  By mid-2008, 71% of teens reported owning a cell phone and 58% used text messaging 
to contact friends – an increase from the 2006 data set I am using (Lenhart 2009).  Furthermore, 
the fastest growing section of Facebook's user base is adults over 35 (Facebook 2009), which 
does not specifically mean that teenagers are abandoning SNS by any stretch of the imagination, 
but, if these sites really are seen by adolescents as a private space, the increasing incursion of 
unwelcome older people may alter younger audiences' use of the sites in as-yet unforeseen ways.   
 While I am pleased with my findings regarding offline network strength and online 
activity, I am disappointed that my results did not show more of an influence of teens' perception 
of the internet as a risk-laden environment, or of teens' own ability to mediate their online 
experiences.  I suspect this is largely due to limitations of the data set.  The questions I used to 
measure risk perception were probably not as effective as I would have liked, while the questions 
about self mediation only covered identity control techniques – profile falsification, etc. as 
opposed to situation management – how teens actually deal with stranger contact, bullying, and 
so forth.  Of equal significance, while the data asks extensive questions about time spent on 
social network sites, reasons for using social network sites, and features used on social network 
sites, it has considerably less information about other online communication methods.  
Specifically, the data on identity vulnerability is explicitly limited to those teens with social 
network profiles, preventing us from doing more than speculating on what forms of identity 
vulnerability the average teenager might face via instant messaging, chat rooms, personal 
websites, or other forms of online communication.  Despite the shortcomings of the Pew data, it 
                                                 
36Recent research suggests that teenagers are less engaged with Twitter than with other communication methods – 
the Twitter userbase is largely 25-54 with 12-17 year olds a distinct minority (Lenhart 2009). 
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was the only logical choice for this study.  It is nationally representative and broad in scope, 
including over a thousand U.S. high school students.  There is essentially no way I, as a solitary 
researcher, could have implemented such a study by myself without significant financial and 
logistical assistance.  Working with what I had, however, I feel I came up with some worthwhile 
results. 
Implications for Existing Theory 
 This project draws from three disparate theoretical traditions, and I believe my results 
serve as a solid synthesis of all three schools.  First, my research strongly reinforces the 
Goffman-based dramaturgical interpretations of online identity work.  SNS are obviously 
powerful agents for impression management; users have massive amounts of control over what 
aspects of their lives are put on display, and with improved security settings, extensive control 
over who has access to that display.  The respondents in the Pew study clearly use SNS in this 
way – their choices over whether or not to share personal information reflect their desires to 
control their online presence.   
 Once again, unwanted viewers serve as 'outsiders' in Goffman's terminology, and teenage 
SNS users use multiple methods to prevent such outsiders from accessing their profiles, which 
are a performance they were not meant to witness.  Profile falsifications, as well as setting a 
profile to “Friends Only” both serve to restrict access to a designated subset of the SNS 
population.  In essence, SNS security settings and their use are a means of separating a 
Goffmanesque back space (the profile itself) from the front space (the school or work 
environment).  Friends who are granted access, meanwhile, are privy to the carefully constructed 
performance that is a SNS profile.  Every choice about what appears on a user’s profile is a 
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calculated step in the process of impression management.  Even the risky information that is 
shared serves to support this performance; as a real name or photograph can serve as verification 
of a performance, so can selectively falsified information.  For SNS users, the risk is simply part 
of the protocol: how can you prove you are who you claim to be without the pertinent data?  
 My results also strongly support and inform the postmodern theory that SNS serve as a 
form of surveillance. SNS, especially in the early stages depicted in the Pew data, are open 
spaces for observation.  By generating a profile, users offer themselves up for observation by a 
network of peers, colleagues, and even strangers.  Information sharing here, as with the 
dramaturgical model, is a necessary part of the SNS activity.  The vast majority of 
profiles/performances are normative: users post real names, photographs, and other identifying 
information as a simple matter of protocol.  Profiles that lack identifying data will be policed by 
the peer group, and users bombarded with requests to add the pertinent material.  Friend-setting 
and other controls seem to simply reinforce the panoptic relationship; limiting access means that 
only the chosen can participate, but those that do have essentially free reign.  A user sees what all 
their Friends are up to, and can freely comment on, post to, and police their Friend networks.  
The catch is that the Friend network can comment, post, and police the user’s performance in 
kind.  This opens the user up to bullying, stranger contact, and all the other risks that come with 
internet communication. 
 As for the developmental psychological literature, there are two key models of online 
activity.  In the “rich get richer” model, teenagers who are popular or socially well-connected 
benefit from using the internet to enhance and reinforce their offline relationships.  The “social 
compensation” model suggests that teenagers who are less popular or socially awkward turn to 
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online communication to find new friends or experiment with social connections that they lack 
offline.  My research effectively supports the rich get richer model; respondents with high levels 
of offline social activity have higher levels of reinforcing usage.  On the other hand, the results 
for the social compensation model are much more inconclusive – the higher a respondent's level 
of offline social activity, the higher their level of exploratory behavior.  This suggests that even 
the “popular” or “non-lonely” teens use exploratory methods.  However, there is an obvious 
limitation of the data set at work here; we only know that the respondents are using these 
communication methods; we do not know why.  It is also reasonable to point out that measuring 
participation in offline social activity does not necessarily measure an individual's feelings of 
loneliness.   
Implications for Policy Makers 
 This study clearly demonstrates how the potential for identity risk is indeed there on 
teens' SNS profiles, and presumably in other vectors for identity work.  Teens regularly post 
personally identifying information, photographs of themselves, and contact information that 
could be accessed by stalkers, scammers, or bullies.  The recent media attention towards the 
suicides of gay teens that were harassed by classmates both in person and online demonstrates 
just one potential problem; when physical violence isn’t an option, Facebook is.  As this is being 
written, several states are considering laws that would criminalize certain acts of bullying, 
including online harassment, and New Jersey recently instituted a set of anti-bullying statutes 
that have been alternately lionized and criticized as too draconian.  (Bazelon 2011; Allen 2011)  
These laws raise serious legal concerns – at what point does Facebook bullying become criminal 
activity?  What rights do the targets of online harassment have?  What is the responsibility of the 
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communications service to inhibit these now-criminal activities?  These questions are beyond the 
scope of my research, but declaring being hateful on the Internet to be an actual crime could set 
some very disturbing First Amendment precedents. 
 That being said, online content providers cannot be trusted to self-regulate.  The entire 
business model of SNS is to gather as much information on their users as possible, with an eye 
towards using that information to lure in more users, who will then share their own information, 
and so on in a sort of “information snowball.”  All of those users can then be bombarded with 
advertisements specifically targeted to their likes, dislikes, hobbies, and interests.  Besides 
serving as a draw for advertising space, users’ personal information can itself be monetized – a 
typical SNS profile contains valuable demographic information that advertisers and marketers 
would pay significant amounts of money for.  While Facebook, MySpace, and other SNS have 
made great strides in improving their privacy policies, at the end of the day the questions of what 
to share and how to share it remain up to the individual user, and much of the truly risky 
information is part of the normative SNS experience.  Removing last names, photographs, and 
hometowns from profiles effectively removes the entire point of SNS.  As such, simply 
attempting to regulate information sharing on SNS through legal channels seems less-than-
feasible.  The most reasonable means of preventing teens from engaging in risky online 
behaviors would be to educate teens directly.  Here we strike the same wall that parents face; 
how do we convince teenagers that any group of adults are worth listening to?  One potential 
vector for this sort of engagement would be working in concert with SNS themselves to 
publicize the availability of privacy and security settings.  As discussed above, SNS have a 
vested interest in keeping information free-flowing, as it is a primary source of advertising 
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revenue.  Essentially, bad publicity may be the most likely way to encourage SNS to enact more 
rigorous privacy protocols; the companies probably will have to be badgered by parents, 
teachers, law enforcement, and (most significantly) the media into making any dramatic changes.   
Even with the popularity of shock-and-horror programming like “To Catch a Predator,” 
campaigns using similar scenarios are probably not the best approach to educating teens about 
online risks.  Encouraging teens to be careful when solicited by strangers does little to prevent 
solicitation by peers (or “near-peers” such as 18-25 year olds), given that the majority of online 
sexual solicitation appears to come from other teenagers and young adults (Wolak Mitchell & 
Finkelhor 2006).  Much of this online solicitation is simply a digital version of the coercion that 
would normally take place in other “back-space” areas of teenage life; bedrooms, back seats of 
cars, and so forth.  As such, trying to frame the problem as “creepy old men” stalking hapless 
young teens is both short-sighted and a disservice to the very audience we are trying to protect.  
Any advertising campaign targeted at informing teenagers about the risks of online activity 
would have to be realistic about the hazards teens face, and take into account their own rationales 
for being online in the first place.   
Another vector for creating positive changes in teenagers’ risky internet behaviors could 
come through the educational system.  Many middle and high school students in the U.S. now 
have the opportunity to take various computer-related courses, and basic internet/SNS safety 
could readily become a component of those programs.  In 2007, Virginia became the first state in 
the U.S. to require internet safety classes in public schools, and starting in 2011, internet safety 
became a mandatory part of the UK primary school curriculum (Hochberg 2007, Fildes 2009).  
Groups like the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, WebWiseKids, and the U.S. 
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Attorney General’s Office all provide a variety of resources for teachers to use in the classroom, 
and some even offer full curricula suitable for students in primary, middle, or high school.  
Adapting these for use on a system-wide level would not be a particularly difficult task.  Even 
then, the fundamental problem with any safety education, whether it be driving safety or safe sex 
or drug abuse education, is that the materials often consist of a great many cautions and 
platitudes that some teenagers follow faithfully, some half-heartedly accept, and others reject 
outright.  Clearly, the educational system has a role to play in internet safety education, but they 
cannot be expected to carry the majority of the burden. 
Implications for Parents 
 On one level, parents need to trust their teenagers.  The vast majority seem to know what 
they are doing, and are navigating SNS just fine.  When they are contacted inappropriately, they 
block the stranger or report it to the appropriate authorities.  Most of the images and comments 
they post are relatively harmless adolescent nonsense.  Essentially, the negative actions of a 
minority are driving much of the moral outrage surrounding teenage internet use.  It is entirely 
possible that as the Facebook generation comes of age and moves into positions of responsibility 
and power in society, the behaviors that terrify today's parents will be seen as “youthful 
indiscretions” in essentially the same way that those parents look back on their own equally 
irresponsible teenage experimentation. 
 That does not mean that parents do not need to be concerned.  While these behaviors may 
be normal (or at least normative), parents and other authority figures still have a vested interest 
in protecting teenaged internet users, especially when SNS themselves have little financial 
reason to do so.  Personal information, after all, is essentially their product.  My results suggest 
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that parental mediation can be an effective deterrent to some forms of teenage internet risk, but 
the mediation must be active.  Simply telling teens where they can and cannot go online is 
largely useless.  It is important to note that parents’ rule-setting behavior had almost no effect on 
what respondents posted to their profiles.  The most effective techniques are those where a parent 
is directly involved in the mediation process – checking a teenager's usage habits to see what 
they have been up to, or using filtering software to block certain sites entirely.  While I 
personally believe the latter to be untenable, as teens will simply find other ways to access 
forbidden information (e.g. from school, a friend’s house, or a smartphone), the broader message 
is clear – internet safety education needs to begin as soon as children are exposed to the internet.    
 Parents must become internet-savvy if they are to have any hope of mediating their teens' 
online activities.  Parents need to familiarize themselves with the various means of 
communication and their unique characteristics, and become as comfortable with the internet as 
their teens are.  If rule-setting behaviors are used, teens must be made aware of the rules, and the 
rules must be enforced.  If a parent tells a child certain sites or activities are forbidden, the parent 
must have some way to back that claim, whether by actively checking where the child has been 
or by using software to block those sites/activities whole cloth.37  You cannot simply tell 
teenagers not to do something – they are teenagers!  
Areas for Future Study 
 Overall, I am happy with the results of my research, but I feel there is still room for 
improvement.  Going forward, investigations into this topic need to use specifically gathered 
                                                 
37A waggish suggestion would be for parents to join the SNS their child uses and Friend their teenager.  While it is 
certainly possible for teens to block their parents from viewing their shared information, at the very least that 
would require the teenager to actively engage with their SNS's safety and privacy settings.  It also might drive 
the child from the service entirely. 
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data, rather than adapting an existing survey.  Were I gathering such a data set, there are quite a 
few things I would do differently.  A more in-depth survey instrument, with specific questions 
about risky activities – not just “have you ever posted photographs to your profile” but “have you 
ever posted pictures of something illegal or unsafe to your profile” or “have you ever posted 
photographs of yourself or your friends in a swimsuit or underwear to your profile?”  I would 
focus on the ways teens mediate their online experiences, focusing on sexual contact, posting of 
personal data, and bullying.  How do teens deal with these situations when they come up online?  
How do they avoid them in the first place?   I would ask more questions about the relationships 
teens have online – how many SNS Friends do they have?  How many people are on their instant 
messaging contact lists?  Who are these Friends and how often do they interact?  I would also 
ask about risky communication via other CMC vectors – chat rooms, instant messaging, chat 
rooms, and so forth.   
 Broader research into adolescent internet activity can go in multiple directions. I would 
like to investigate both parents' and teens' perceptions of internet risk – if they see the internet as 
risky, where did those concepts come from?  The media, peer groups, or safety advocates?  Do 
existing prevention methods actually help teens negotiate the internet?  A focused study of 
teenagers’ awareness and deployment of online safety features would be worthwhile – do teens 
know what privacy settings are available on SNS, and do they actually utilize them?  How is 
knowledge of privacy options transmitted – through announcements by the SNS themselves or 
via the all-too-common panicked chain forward of the “hackers broke into facebook/facebook is 
going to start charging users/selling user data to the chinese” variety?38  I am also interested in 
                                                 
38 These generally end up being hoaxes, although occasionally useful information can be disseminated in this 
manner (Mikkelson & Mikkelson 2011) 
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the particular finding that respondents with Black parents have a higher likelihood of risky 
information sharing over SNS.  A targeted study of Black teens, their parents, and internet usage 
would help understand why this audience is particularly at risk. 
I would also be interested in studying the reasons and ways in which teens use other 
online communication methods, particularly online video.  In addition to further exploration of 
why teens use SNS, an investigation of teenagers who do not use SNS and their motives for 
staying disconnected would be fascinating.  I would also be interested in studying teens' 
immersion in other media; time spent watching television, time spent listening to music, etc. as a 
way of returning to the line of questioning that led to this research in the first place.   
 In closing, a story that I hope displays the challenges of SNS; in early 2011 an Indiana 
woman created a Facebook account claiming to be a 17-year-old girl in hopes of gaining 
incriminating information about her ex-husband.  The ex-husband proceeded to tell the presumed 
teenager that he was planning to kill his ex-wife and their children, and expressed interest in 
hiring an assassin.  When the ex-wife handed transcripts of the conversations over to the FBI 
looking to have him arrested, the man provided a notarized statement, signed before he accepted 
the false account's Friend request, that he suspected the fake account was his ex-wife, and that he 
had lied to her in order to incriminate her in their ongoing child custody case.  All charges 
against the man were dropped. (thesmokinggun.com 2011)  Perhaps instead of being concerned 
with children acting too much like adults, our real problem is adults acting too much like 
children. 
  
123 
A Chili Recipe, Just To See If Anyone Ever Reads This: 
 1.5 lbs ground meat of choice 
 1-2 cans tomato sauce 
 1 can diced tomatoes (with or without peppers) 
 2 cans beans, your choice 
 1/2 onion, chopped 
 1/2 bell pepper, chopped 
 3 cloves garlic, minced 
 1 can corn niblets (optional) 
 Pinch of brown sugar 
 Splash of beer 
 CHILI SEASONING: 
 1 tsp dried basil 
 2 tsp white sugar 
 2 tsp cumin 
 4 tsp chili powder 
 1 tbsp onion powder 
 1 tbsp red pepper (or to taste) 
 1 tbsp garlic powder 
 2 tbsp flour 
 Salt 
Brown beef in a skillet.  Drain corn and beans, combine all canned ingredients in dutch oven or 
crock pot.  Drain fat from beef, add to pot.  Saute all vegetables in oil, add to pot.  Add seasoning 
mix to pot.  Add brown sugar and beer.  Bring to a boil.  Let simmer until you are too hungry to 
continue simmering. 
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